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E-MARRIAGE: BREAKING THE MARRIAGE MONOPOLY

Adam Candeub and Mae Kuykendall*

ABSTRACT: This Article advocates updating the law governing marriage formation to recognize the shift in social interactions from real to virtual life. We argue that couples can use internet communications not only to marry when separated by great distance but also to choose which state's laws will authorize their marriage. In particular, same sex couples could marry under the laws of a state that permit such unions, regardless of where they exchange vows.

States inadvertently have created geographic monopolies, requiring each marriage receiving the benefits of their licensing laws to be performed within their borders. This Article's model builds upon established precedents, such as proxy marriage and choice of law for multi-jurisdictional and internet contracts. Using the power of internet communications, our proposal allows states to compete over marriage's procedures and substance. Depending on a couple's preferences for "e-ritual" and a state's desired level of regulatory control, couples could consume the trappings of a traditional ceremony before their friends and family, without travelling to another jurisdiction, perhaps with an officiant presiding on-line from a remote location. More simply, couples could have a complete marriage ceremony in the location of their choice, but would receive a license and file necessary papers with a distant state jurisdiction.

Some states do not recognize types of marriages that other states authorize, *i.e.*, Massachusetts same sex marriage or Louisiana covenant marriage. Every type of e-marriage will not be enforceable everywhere. We argue, however, that marriage satisfies a unique human need for socially sanctioned commitment, which a simple contract cannot satisfy, a point ignored by those who argue for a purely private, contractual approach to marriage. E-marriage can more efficiently distribute the "status good" of marriage—even if it cannot provide a legally enforceable relationship in every state. Finally, our proposal encourages a legal cosmopolitanism as individuals witness a variety of sanctioned relationships within their own places of worship and communities, defusing protracted political struggles at the state level over substantive marriage rules.

Introduction

States routinely allow an individual or entity outside their geographic borders to use their laws. All fifty states allow a non-resident or non-domiciliary to incorporate under their laws. Contracts frequently contain choice-of-law provisions that specify which state's law will be controlling, even though neither contracting party is physically present within the selected jurisdiction. States have dispensed with burdensome procedures for creating corporations,

opening their business legal regimes to both residents and non-residents, thereby creating jurisdictional competition to best satisfy businesses' need for convenience and flexibility.

Yet state law for forming marriage, the most critical legal tie for most people, shows little development or analysis, imposing arbitrary, sometimes prohibitive, conditions, ranging from both parties' physical presence within the state authorizing the marriage to peculiar requirements on officiants' identity and residence.¹ Both legislatures' and academics' failure to define, or even examine, states' regulatory aim for laws governing marriage formation, *e.g.*, consumer convenience, efficiency, health, or paternalistic protection against unwise marriage, is both striking and unjustifiable, especially when compared with the attention lavished upon state authority over other legal orderings, such as corporations.² Finally, the universal, and quite burdensome, requirement that couples be physically present in the state authorizing their marriage seems unjustifiable. There is nothing inherently local about marriage, as there is with other areas of state regulatory control, such as hunting or waste disposal.³ The marriage status is

¹ See *infra* Section III (reviewing notable features of the states' procedural rules for getting married).

² As an example of the complete lack of interest in goals and purpose of the procedural rules governing marriage formation, a law professor recently (for personal reasons) noticed Virginia's requirements that lay, but not religious, officiants must be Virginia residents. See Ilya Somin, A Minor but Annoying Example of Unconstitutional Religious Discrimination in Virginia Marriage Law: (http://www.volokh.com/archives/archive_2008_04_27-2008_05_03.shtml). His reaction was to question whether the distinction unfairly discriminated against the non-religious, never raising the obvious question: whether the entire regulatory regime had any coherent, recognizable purpose. ..

To find a sustained, rigorous examination of and the purpose of marriage law, one must go back to the work of Mary E. Richmond, a founder of American professional social work, who wrote an ignored classic, *Marriage and the State* (1929), with Fred Hall, an eminent family lawyer. It is a remarkable volume, brimming with a progressive faith in reform and social scientific empiricism that catalogues and critiques the swathe of marriage law found in the several states. She warns that reform will be premature "until, for at least another generation, the subject of marriage administration has been dealt with intelligently, systematically, and in careful detail." MARY E. RICHMOND & FRED S. HALL, MARRIAGE AND THE STATE 137 at 337 n. 1 (1929). Her call for examination of marriage regulation went largely unheeded. This strange stasis could be explained anthropologically in that the marriage relationship is so basic that it is part of the unexamined, even unnoticed, social structure. Or, it could be that no one bothers to litigate the matter. Even legal scholars whom the current regulation harms or inconveniences, like Somin, concede no interest in litigating the matter. See Somin *infra*.

³ See, *e.g.*, *United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority*, 261 F.3d 245 (2d Cir. 2001) ("This temptation, to which we do not succumb, arises from the well-settled principle that waste disposal is a traditional local government function, *citing* Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4); *C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown*, 511 U.S. at 419-20, 114 S. Ct. 1677 (Souter, J., dissenting));

instantly portable, bearing universal expressive value. Further, potential couples possess a strong constitutional interest in access to marriage without needless barriers.⁴ Why does the law of marriage, and the debate about it, remain stuck in viewing marriage as necessarily involving those plastic figures, members or not of the expected sexes, trapped on the top of a wedding cake baked in the jurisdiction in which they currently reside?

This puzzle reveals a vacuum in legal policy, not even addressed fully by proposals for national marriage law.⁵ Building on deeply rooted but overlooked precedent in both ancient and modern law concerning marriage by proxy,⁶ telephone, and mail, we propose “e-marriage.”⁷ A

Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982) (“[P]rotecting the health of its citizens-and not simply the health of its economy-is at the core of its police power.”); *see also* *Cal. Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works*, 199 U.S. 306, 320-21 (1905)).

⁴ *See, e.g.*, *Lawrence v. Texas*, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (noting that “our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education”); *Zablocki v. Redhail*, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (“the right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals”); *Loving v. Virginia*, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival,” *quoting* *Skinner v. State of Oklahoma*, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).

⁵ In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, concern for uniformity led to proposals to amend the constitution to nationalize the marriage laws, which is the rule in Canada and Australia. Justice Frankfurter cited these efforts and the foreign examples and discussed what the Court could do, within its institutional competence, to contribute to a second best solution of substantial uniformity, particularly in divorce rules. *Williams v. State of North Carolina*, 317 U.S. 287, 216 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), citing Ames, Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States during the First Century of its History, contained in the Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1896, vol. II, p. 190; Sen.Doc. No. 93, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., and the successive compilations prepared by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. *Id.* at 217, concerning efforts to bring national uniformity to divorce laws (citing Proceedings of Governors’ Conference (1910) 185-98; Proceedings of National Congress on Uniform Divorce Laws (1906)). Rather than a national law, fairly brittle local procedural rules govern marriage formation, and with trends generally favoring a degree of uniformity in the substance of the legal status. Joanna L. Grossman, *Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem of Non-Uniform Marriage Laws*, 84 OREGON L. REV. 433, 442-44 (2005).

⁶ CALIFORNIA FAM. CODE § 420 (b) (providing for marriage of a member of the Armed Forces of the United States who is serving overseas and in a conflict or war and who is unable to appear to be married by means of a personal appearance by an attorney in fact with a power of attorney that meets standards for witnesses); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-10 (2) (permitting an officiant to exercise discretion if a third party holds a written authorization to act for one of a couple “unable to be present” and providing for petition to a court if the officiant “is not satisfied”); Delaware- § 120 (providing procedures for an attending physician to act as proxy if he provides an affidavit that the marriage applicant is at the point of death and may lawfully marry); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-301 (2) – (4) (permitting double proxy marriage and requiring that one party to the marriage be “a member of the armed forces of the United States on federal active duty or a resident of Montana at the time of application” and providing for discretion by the officiant and access to court to seek a court order if the officiant “is not satisfied”); TEX. CODE ANN. FAM. § 2.006 (a) – (c) (generally permitting a single proxy upon affidavit but permitting a double proxy marriage only if each applicant provides an affidavit that he or she is:(1) on active duty as a member of the armed forces of the United States or the state military forces; or (2) confined in a correctional facility.).

state that adopts e-marriage would allow couples outside its borders to marry under its laws, prescribing, if it wished, an internet “virtual” presence in the state granting the marriage or simply allowing couples outside its borders to receive and file licenses easily by internet download. A state could define and limit e-marriage according to its own policy objectives. In this way, a Louisianan could have a Vermont same sex marriage in Louisiana while a Vermonter could have a Louisiana covenant marriage.⁸ States could compete to provide substantive and procedural marriage laws, and individuals could efficiently access the laws they desire. While Vermont may prefer not to enforce the terms of a Louisiana covenant marriage, couples who exchange vows in Vermont may still undertake a legal covenant marriage under Louisianan law before their friends, family, and community.

⁷ Proxy marriage, and other forms of distance marriage, have received both scholarly and professional attention, but usually during wartime or shortly after, as the following listing of all known articles on the subject reveals. We attribute the timing of this interest to the problem of soldiers leaving their intimate partners on the home front. See Maurice Possley, *Marriage By Proxy Booming in Montana*, 32 MONT. L. REV. 32 (2007); Ernest G. Lorenzen, *Marriage By Proxy and the Conflict of Laws*, 32 HARV. L. REV. 1918-1919; Note, *Marriage By Mail*, 32 HARV. L. REV. 848 (1919); Note, *Marriage By Proxy—Conflict of Laws*, 2 NEW YORK L. REV. 343 (1924); Stanley Roberts, *Marriage by Proxy: Including a Brief Consideration of the Nature of Marriage and of Agency*, 50 S. AFRICAN L.J. 280 (1943); A. Stern, *Marriages by Proxy in Mexico*, 19 SO. C. L. 109 (1945); W.H. Howery, *Marriage by Proxy and Other Informal Marriages*, 13 U. MISSOURI KANSAS CITY L. REV. 48 (1944); Note, *Validity of Proxy Marriages in Kentucky*, 35 KY. L.J. 228 (1946-1947); Lillian M. Gordon, *The Need for Certainty and Equality in the Laws of the American States*, 20 THE SOCIAL SERVICE REVIEW 29 (1946); W.O. Weyrauch, *Informal and Formal Marriage—An Appraisal of Trends in Family Organization*, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 88 (1960); Marvin M. Moore, *The Case for Proxy Marriage*, 11 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 313 (1962).

⁸ Louisiana offers “covenant marriage” in addition to standard marriage. Covenant marriages are not dissolvable though no-fault divorce in either couple can simply claim irreconcilable differences but rather, as with older statutes, See LSA-R.S. 9:272 (“A covenant marriage terminates only for one of the causes enumerated in Civil Code Article 101. A covenant marriage may be terminated by divorce only upon one of the exclusive grounds enumerated in R.S. 9:307. [These grounds are one of the spouse’s adultery; conviction of a felony and has been sentenced to death or imprisonment at hard labor; spousal abandonment for one year and constantly refuses to return; the spouse has physically or sexually abused the spouse seeking the divorce or a child of one of the spouses; the spouses have been living separate and apart continuously without reconciliation for a period of two year; the spouse’s excesses, cruel treatment, or outrages of the other spouse]”); see also John Witte, Jr. & Joel A. Nichols *More Than A Mere Contract: Marriage As Contract And Covenant In Law And Theology*, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 595, 595 (2008) (“On August 15, 1997, the State of Louisiana put in place the nation’s first modern covenant marriage law. The law creates a two-tiered system of marriage. Couples may choose a contract marriage, with minimal formalities of formation and attendant rights to no-fault divorce. Or couples may choose a covenant marriage, with more stringent formation and dissolution rules.”). Arizona also offers covenant marriage. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-901 to 25-906 (setting forth requirements similar to Louisiana’s).

We argue that an essential utility of marriage involves participating in a public ritual creating a legally sanctioned commitment. Even if, for instance, a Vermont same sex marriage is not legally cognizable in Louisiana, the marriage is still valuable to a same sex Louisiana couple.⁹ States' current geographic monopoly on marriage solemnizing requires couples (and their marriage guests) seeking a marriage regime different from that of their domiciliary state to travel at great expense.¹⁰ Beyond eliminating this inefficiency, our proposal encourages a legal cosmopolitanism, exposing organic-vegetable eating Vermonters to Louisiana covenant marriage and Jambalaya-eating Louisianans to Vermont same sex marriage. At the same time, e-marriage lessens the need for protracted political struggles at the state level over substantive marriage law. Finally, e-marriage proceeds from and enriches the way we live now. Significant social relations have migrated to the Internet, creating communities with little connection to legal jurisdiction or geographic borders. E-marriage allows myriad communities to sanction marriage, maximizing couple's choices, at the same time satisfying the need for social sanction.

This Article proceeds as follows: In Section I, we set forth our theory of marriage as a status good. We critique the conventional legal classifying of marriage as either a status or contract and explain why e-marriage best furthers the regulatory goal of an efficient distribution of the benefits of marriage. Section II examines the history of the law regulating marriage formation to conclude there is no geographical limit to authority of states to authorize marriage.. Section III examines the current law for marriage formation, describing its unreflective, non-innovative nature. Section IV puts forth several legislative e-marriage proposals, describing how e-marriage would change the current legal practice.

⁹ Ann Laquer Estin, *Unofficial Family Law*, 94 IOWA L. REV. 449, 458 (2009).

¹⁰ See M.V. Lee Badgett, Christopher Ramos & Brad Sears, *The Economic Impact of Extending Marriage to Same-Sex Couples in Vermont*, The Williams Institute at 1, 7 (March 2009), available at <http://www.law.ucla.edu/WilliamsInstitute/pdf/VT%20econ%20impact%20final.pdf> (estimating the travel-related expenses for out-of-state couples seeking marriage in Vermont will be an average of \$910.00).

I. Marriage: Not Contract, not Status, but Enabling Regulation for a Status Good

Conventional legal wisdom vacillates in its classification of marriage between a (i) government-regulated and -created status¹¹ and (ii) self-regulating contractual or religious agreement.¹² Neither classification is complete. Both mislead. Although marriage is, in part, a legal status, many have incorrectly concluded that states have primary regulatory control over defining the substance and procedure of marriage, a position clearly at odds with the history of marriage both in this country and England and, indeed, throughout the West. As has been shown and as we discuss in length in Section II, marriage has always involved, particularly in the United States, a complicated exchange among individual choice, religious communities, and

¹¹ BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) ("A person's legal condition, whether personal or proprietary; the sum total of a person's legal rights, duties, liabilities, and other legal relations, or any particular group of them separately considered"); Cass Sunstein, *The Right To Marry*, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2095 (2005) ("My conclusion is that the "right to marry" entails both some right of intimate association in the private sphere and (more relevantly for present purposes) an individual right of access to the official institution of marriage so long as the state provides that institution. With respect to the access right, the best analogy is to the right to vote."); Richard A. Wilson, *The State of The Law of Protecting and Securing the Rights of Same-Sex Partners In Illinois Without Benefit of Statutory Rights Accorded Heterosexual Couples*, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 323, 330 (2007) ("Derived from the status as a social and legal construct, not a bargained-for, expressly enumerated transaction, the rights of married persons and the legal protections -- the "benefits and burdens" -- of marriage are neither inherently nor in fact a matter of contract. Neither are they set forth in any detail in a given state's marriage statutes."); see generally MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS (Lisa Bernstein, ed. 2006); ERIN A. O'HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 161 (2009) ("We typically think of marriage as a status . . . But from a legal [perspective, marriage also can be viewed as a kind of standard form contract, . . .").

¹² Legal scholars have advocated treating marriage as purely or largely a contractual relationship for decades. See Daniel A. Crane, *A "Judeo-Christian" Argument for Privatizing Marriage*, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1221, 1222-23 (2006); Sunstein, *supra* note 11, at 2115 ("As a matter of law, at least, people can generally leave the marital form whenever they wish to do so. Increasingly, marriage resembles a contract, dissoluble at the will of the parties, rather than a permanent status."); Eric Rasmussen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, *Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage Contract*, 73 IND. L. J. 453, 464-5 (1998) ("couples should be authorized to legally define their own marriages. Many arguments have been made, and have gained general acceptance, that courts should enforce agreements as to the terms of divorce, at least regarding the division of property. Courts should be authorized to also enforce private agreements regarding grounds for divorce and terms of an ongoing marriage"); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, *Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy*, 70 CAL. L. REV. 204, 205-06 (1982) (arguing for the desirability of a new pattern of intimate relations law in which contractual tools and processes would play a critical role. . . . consciously deciding where to apply contract principles with enthusiasm, where to discard them as inappropriate, and where to tailor them to the special context of marriage").

Others argue that marriage is purely religious. See *Kniec proposes end of legally recognized marriage*, Catholic News Service, May 28, 2009 ("The net effect of that, would be to turn over -- quite appropriately, it seems to me, the concept of marriage to churches and a church understanding,") (<http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/new.php?n=16128>); *Cleveland v. United States*, 329 U.S. 14, 25 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("[w]e must recognize, then, that polygyny, like other forms of marriage, is basically a cultural institution rooted deeply in the religious beliefs and social mores of those societies in which it appears.").

state law.¹³ We set forth a view that marriage blends state sanction, ritual, and personal choice, rendering it distinct from either a private contract or state regulatory franchise.¹⁴ In a novel argument, this section argues that marriage is a status good that only the state can confer. Marriage authorization law should be directed towards the efficient distribution of this good, thereby giving modern marriage authorization law a clear regulatory purpose, which its current haphazard rules do not provide. The notion that marriage can be best described as either a contract or status obscures what we advance here as the correct understanding--a theory of marriage as state-conferred status good.

A. Not Contract or Status

Many support a state withdrawal from marriage to solve the cultural conflict about marriage of same sex couples. As a recent example, two college students in California are working to promote a constitutional amendment abolishing marriage.¹⁵ In a typical formulation, one student was quoted as saying: “This is a compromise. It says ‘Get rid of marriage as a state institution. Make it a religious institution, keep politics out of it and stop the fighting.’”¹⁶

Suggestions along these lines misapprehend the long history and value of marriage as a benefit, even status good, which the state must help to provide..Marriage responds to individuals’ need for a public recognition of their unions, not simply a contract. Consumer behavior supports this claim. For instance, while fewer than 5 percent of couples spend the money or expend the

¹³ See generally Ann Laquer Estin, *Unofficial Family Law*, 94 IOWA L. REV. 449, 454 (2009) (examining the interaction between formal legal marriage and informal, religious marriage)..

¹⁴ RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, *NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS* 71 (2008).

¹⁵ California Ballot Initiative Launched to Get State Out of the Marriage Business, <http://www.towleroad.com/2009/03/ballot-initiative-launched-to-get-california-out-of-the-marriage-business.html>, last visited October 10, 2009.

¹⁶ Aurelio Rojas, *Prop. 8 foes push new ballot measures to reverse gay marriage ban*, The Sacramento Bee, Jan. 21, 2009, at 3A.

efforts to obtain prenuptial agreements to specify or alter their legal rights under the law,¹⁷ the average couple (or their families) spends over \$20,000 on their marriage ceremony and party.¹⁸ A cross-sectional study of the five bridal magazines with highest circulation reveals no article concerning marriage's legal import.¹⁹ Marriage and its rituals retain their social and personal significance even though there is considerably less social pressure to marry than in the past. Society now accepts matters typically associated exclusively within a sanctioned marriage, such as child-rearing and sexual relations, to be done *outside* of marriage.²⁰ Finally, if lay people valued marriage as a contract, they would more often use pre-nuptial agreements, which modify the marriages "pre-packaged" legal contract or status.²¹ Prenuptial agreements are used, however, only rarely.²² If individuals lack the interest to modify the terms of legal marriage, individuals either are completely pleased with the terms (arguably unlikely) or value marriage for reasons other than legal.

Most broadly, classifying marriage as a contract simply ignores its public nature, its involvement with social sanction and its socially sanctioned ritual. Anthropologists have long recognized marriage's unique function in human society, a role that has remained remarkably constant through history and culture. Claude Lévi-Strauss writes

¹⁷ Heather Mahar, *Why Are There So Few Prenuptial Agreements?* Harvard Law School, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series (2003) at 2 (http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1224&context=harvard_olin); ALLISON A. MARSTON, *PLANNING FOR LOVE: THE POLITICS OF PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS* 891 (1997) ("Of marrying couples, approximately 5 percent (about 50,000) sign prenuptials each year."); Allison A. Marston, *Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements*, 49 *STAN. L. REV.* 887, 891 (1997) (same); ARLENE DUBIN, *PRENUPS FOR LOVERS: A ROMANTIC GUIDE TO PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS* 15 (2001) ("Anecdotal evidence suggests that 5 to 10 percent of couples . . . now enter into prenups.").

¹⁸ According to the website Cost of Wedding, on average, "US couples spend \$20,398 for their wedding. However, the majority of couples spend between \$15,299 and \$25,498 . . . This does not include cost for a honeymoon or engagement ring." See <http://www.costofwedding.com/>.

¹⁹ Study on file with authors.

²⁰ We expand upon this argument in Section III.

²¹ Like corporate status, civil marriage today serves as an off-the-rack rule. See *Marriage Licenses*, 89 *MINN L. REV.* 1758, 1781 (2005).

²² See *infra* note 17.

“every society has some way to operate a distinction between free unions and legal ones. Whatever the way in which the collectivity expresses its interest in the marriage of its members, whether through the authority vested in strong consanguinial groups, or more directly through the intervention of the state, it remains true that marriage is not, is never, and cannot be a private business.”²³

Viewed from this light, marriage is more than a private contract.²⁴ In the words of Claude Lévi-Strauss, it is never a “private business.”

Finally, marriage creates state enforced rules for exit and provides a unique haven in which privacy and autonomy may flourish between intimate partners. Such understandings protect women from entering marriages that lack legal substance and over which religions exercise the only say as to the obligations of the parties.²⁵ Similarly, it protects uneducated or unwary women from relying on false understandings of their rights or obligations that social groups might encourage.²⁶

Conversely, we reject viewing marriage exclusively as a status regulated by the state for two reasons. First, marriage statutes have evolved toward a relatively standard, though un-

²³ Claude Lévi-Strauss, “The Family,” in *MAN, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY* (Harry L. Shapiro, ed. 1956) at 147. We recognize that anthropologists today do not universally accept Lévi-Strauss’s view about the universality of marriage—or the universality of virtually anything else concerning human social relations. See Lawrence Rosen, *Anthropological Perspectives on the Abolition of Marriage in MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS* (Lisa Bernstein, ed. 2006) (“The ‘answer’ to the debate over the abolition of marriage—like many other issues in law and social policy—does not lie in some arcane example proving or disproving a universal proposition, but in the comprehension of how, in each society, linkages are configured.”). As we argue below, however, the “need” for marriage has sufficient cross-cultural consistency to survive, despite the decreased social pressure to marry “Getting married” reasonably can be said to be a desire in and of itself. It may be that by affirming the category of marriage as a socially powerful practice, the state “does harm” in some instances. See Lisa Bernstein, *Epilogue*, in *MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS* (Lisa Bernstein, ed. 2006). But marriage also appears by any reasonable approximation to be a desire even if the state did not provide a blueprint. For now, to recognize the nexus of marriage’s value across cultures and the role of the state in facilitating its flourishing does not oblige us to peer any deeper into the endogeneity between law and human desire.

²⁴ Richmond and Hall addressed the error, made by Blackstone, of simplifying the legal significance of marriage by equating it with contract. See *RICHMOND & HALL*, *supra* note 2, at 332 (discussing “the nature of the state’s relation to the contracting parties”).

²⁵ Estin, *supra* note 9, at 14 (discussing the French rule on religious and civil marriages).

²⁶ *Id.*

innovative format,²⁷ suggesting that states now have no capacity or incentive to innovate, experiment, or improvement of the sort associated with modern regulation. The current regime, so to speak, has little to recommend it other than a preference for status quo. State law’s remarkable consistency has been well-documented, with most states moving towards similarity in licensing, waiting period, and solemnization requirements.²⁸

Second, marriage as state regulatory franchise conflicts with marriage as an agreement, initiated and controlled by those who are getting married—a view fundamental to Anglo-American matrimonial law, a subject to which we will return. While status-advocates will often describe marriage as a “consented to legal status,” that misses an important point. As we discuss below, the state, particularly in the United States, historically never had a monopoly in defining that status, as discrete local and religious communities often assumed that role. If marriage is a legal status, it is a strange, de-centered one in which religion, custom, the need for personal autonomy²⁹ and various state jurisdictions interact to define its contours.³⁰

B. Marriage as a regulatory regime to efficiently distribute a status good

²⁷ Joanna L. Grossman, *Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting The Problem Of Non-Uniform Marriage Laws*, 84 OR. L. REV. 433, 434, 442 (2005) (“While non-uniform marriage laws and the conflicts they engender are not new, the most significant disagreements among states about marriage law were resolved by the last third of the twentieth century. Thus, the recent introduction of same-sex marriage in a single state has disrupted a period of relative calm. . . . The differences that had been so pronounced in the first half of the twentieth century all but disappeared in the second half. . . . A snapshot of state marriage laws circa 1995 reveals a remarkably uniform system . . .”).

²⁸ We discuss the basic procedures found in all state marriage, *infra* in section III.

²⁹ *See also* WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY VI, PT. I, (“Marriage is a matter of more worth/Then to be dealt in by attorneyship”).

³⁰ We agree with Ann Laquer Estin that in matters of marriage and family law “state law and legal institutions have only a limited degree of control over society, and do not necessarily dominate or displace other social systems. Another question is that individuals may be simultaneously subject to different systems of rules, and these systems may not be coordinated or hierarchically arranged. . . .” Estin, *supra* note 9, at 454. Estin continues, though, saying, “official law functions as a gatekeeping tool to define the shape of both family life and the broader social and political community.” *Id.* at 455. Estin thoroughly reviews the fact that the rules for marital exit are a critical benefit of state sanctioning. *Id.*, at 470-73.

If neither contract nor status perfectly captures the nature of marriage, what does? Lawyers not surprisingly, view marriage in legal terms and debate endlessly whether it is a status or contract. Maybe, however, they overlook something essential that lay people better understand. Lay people seem less concerned with controlling legal aspects of marriage than with its ceremonial and symbolic aspects. The lay conception of marriage appears to involve the (i) public acknowledgement of love and commitment (ii) accompanied by an official government sanction, a religious sanction as well, or both. Marriage, even in our sophisticated times, retains a transformative mystery. Couples talk about taking “the plunge” into an unknown world – not an established legal world of duties and obligations, or a world in which there is negotiation over contract terms. Nice questions of legal rights are not really part of the popular understanding of what marriage is, and rarely become significant to people except perhaps at divorce. Further, the lay vision of marriage seems centered upon the official, governmental sanction aspect of marriage.

This lay vision of marriage conflicts with the frequently voiced view of state controlled and licensed marriage as at best anachronistic³¹ or at worse oppressive.³² While we leave aside the question of whether marriage, itself, is a social practice that creates and furthers dependency and inequality, we take issue with those who argue that marriage should be reduced to a purely private, unceremonial relationship.³³ The stock film or television footage of a marriage

³¹ Richard H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, *NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS* (2008)

³² See, e.g., Dianne Post, *Why Marriage Should Be Abolished*, 18 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 283 (1997) (claiming that marriage is a disaster); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, *THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES* 228 (1995) (arguing that marriage be abolished).

³³ Cass R. Sunstein, *The Right To Marry*, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081 (2005) (“But private arrangements, religious and otherwise, might provide as much protection of children as official marriage does; and the protection of children might be ensured directly, through requirements of care and support, rather than through marriage in its current form.”); Estin, *supra* note 9, at 479 (noting that the laws in the areas of contracts, public benefits, immigration, bankruptcy, and tax are built upon commonly held marriage norms and commenting that

ceremony inevitably includes the phrase “by the power vested in me by the State of . . .” This pervasive trope defies those who argue that the state is a stranger to the meanings of marriage, fit only to grant civil unions.

The genesis of desires for marriage deepened by official ceremony seems both obscure and profound. They may stem from the view that marriage is a mechanism to avoid hyperbolic discounting of the benefits of marriage.³⁴ While the frustration and difficulties inherent to any long-term relationship are hard to bear, the benefit of “sticking with it” outweigh these disutilities. People, therefore, marry to make it difficult to end their long-term relationships on the basis of relatively short-lived unhappiness. An official marriage ceremony may be part of the psychology of making marriage worthwhile and violation of the public, official, or “sacred” marriage vows part of the disutility of ending a long-term relationship. Relatedly, the expense and trouble of a wedding can serve as credible signal for sincere desires and intention to observe marriage vows.

Similarly, to the degree norms and role motivate individuals to act, the legal creation of certain roles gives people societal scripts—allowing them to engage in virtuous, praiseworthy behavior.³⁵ Officially sanctioning relations *allows* people to be “good husbands” or “good wives.” Many believe that a human’s most basic desires include fulfilling a social role. Whether this conception of marriage renders human beings more Aristotelian purpose seekers than utility maximizers is a dispute for a much longer article. We just think that the lay vision of marriage is

““[p]rivatizing marriage would require construction of new rules, a new official law, in each of these different frameworks.”)

³⁴ Barbara Stark, *Marriage Proposals: From One-Size-Fits-All To Postmodern Marriage Law*, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1479 (2001).

³⁵ See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 203 (arguing that it is “rationally justifiable to conceive of each human life as a unity, so that we may try to specify each such life as having its good and so that we may understand the virtues as having their function in enabling an individual to make of his or her life one kind of unity rather than another”).

(and always has been) related to community, state, ceremony and status. Legal proposals that wish to do away with the nexus are simply fighting the facts.

Given the imperfectly understood, yet undeniable, way people value the social sanctioning of marriage, perhaps the best way to understand it is as a certain type of status good, like the receipt of a government medal or award. A status good is simply a good the demand for which is inspired by social rather than by utilitarian product attributes.³⁶ Rather than provide utility in the more normal sense of nourishment, shelter, adornment, pleasure, or possession, status goods provide prestige.³⁷ Marriage is a status good that requires state sanction and/or religion as necessary parts of its “social attributes.”

As such, marriage is a prestige good that paradoxically *requires* a type of monopoly, *i.e.*, it is a good only the government, with the possible involvement of religion, can provide. We argue that the form in which the monopoly is now exercised-- at the state level with geographic parameters--should be broken to allow any state or jurisdiction to offer marriage anywhere. We would release the energy of federalism to create competition and potentially greater consumer surplus. . The status value of marriage is in some way a function of the size, depth, and closeness (whether spatial or cultural) of the community that recognizes it. Presumably, the more people and jurisdictions that recognize a marriage, the more valuable it is. In this sense, our proposal offers a trade-off or maximization. We would permit a plethora of types of marriages (same sex, covenant, etc.), increasing choice but possibly offering choices of diminished value.

³⁶ Roger Mason, *Measuring The Demand For Status Goods: An Evaluation Of Means-End Chains And Laddering*, in 2 EUROPEAN ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RESEARCH 78-81 (1995).

³⁷ Gene M. Grossman & Carl Shapiro, *Foreign Counterfeiting of Status Goods*, 103 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 79, 81 (1988).

In this way, we would undercut two types of market power that characterize the provision of marriage. First (and most obvious), state sanction is necessary to create the good of marriage. We would not completely destroy this market power, as one would still require some state (one of fifty) to authorize the marriage. This market power, however, would be severely limited. Second, there is the “local monopoly,” or, perhaps more precisely, a “lock-in” whereby individuals who wish to marry in their community before their friends and family must use laws of that locality’s state. Inevitably, part of the value of the ceremony depends upon its performance in the community in which the participants, in fact, live or in which most of their friends and relatives live.³⁸ E-marriage would largely end this type of lock-in or market power. One could have the law of whatever state in whatever location.

Looking at precedent for a genuinely competitive market in law that maximizes individual control, yet maintains the value of state sanction, we would point to certain federalist features of corporate law and the efficiencies they create. A corporation organized in one state comes into being in another upon the delivery through in-state intermediaries of pro forma filings.³⁹ Because corporate promoters can avail themselves of a state’s laws without domiciling in such state or establishing even a temporary presence, states strive to provide the best legal mechanisms for formation, often using new technology; convenience and lower cost are critical factors that businesses value and states work to provide. While some writers have noted that

³⁸ See JANE AUSTEN, *PRIDE AND PREJUDICE*, Ch. 50 (“And their mother had the satisfaction of knowing that she should be able to shew her married daughter in the neighbourhood, before she was banished to the North.”).

³⁹ Indeed, Vermont, a pioneer in innovative marriage, is an innovator in corporate form, permitting for the first time in the nation corporations that exist only in cyberspace, without requiring such companies to have a physical location for such essential corporate functions as board meetings or process service. See <http://gigaom.com/2008/06/17/vermont-oks-the-creation-of-virtual-corporations/>. Further, corporations have begun to develop permissions developed in state codes to hold “virtual shareholder meetings,” in which shareholders may attend electronically and “ask questions and cast their votes live via the internet,” using innovative technology developed for the purpose. Rick E. Hansen, *Corporate Governance: Revisiting Virtual Stockholder Meetings, Insights*, 23 *THE CORPORATE & SECURITIES LAW ADVISOR* (2009).

marriage laws might form a market for law,⁴⁰ and some have offered an analogy of marriage to business forms,⁴¹ commentators and states have overlooked the potential for states to fashion their legal mechanism of marriage for consumption by those located, and remaining, outside their borders.⁴²

We stress, moreover, that we see marriage law bearing only a family resemblance to other enabling regulations,⁴³ like corporate codes. We do not argue that a marriage “is” a corporation. Just as we find uninformative the debate over whether marriage is a status or a contract, we see no need to taxonomize marriage. What we do argue, however, is that marriage as a type of legal ordering can borrow elements of corporation law, in particular, its enabling of individuals to access and utilize state legal systems to facilitate their business purposes, with or without physical presence within the state.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ F.A. Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, *Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars*, 2001 ILL. L. REV. 561; O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, *supra* note 11, at 161 (“marriage also can be viewed as a kind of standard form contract, much like a corporation”). O’Hara and Ribstein explore the notion of the “market in marriage law.” *Id.* at 166-68 They realize the efficiency benefits in allowing individuals to choose the applicable law. *Id.* at 171 (“the benefits of a market for state marriage law are at least as clear as the benefits of a law market in other contexts”). O’Hara & Ribstein, however, do not realize the possibility (and benefits) of cross-border marriage law. *Id.* at 168 (“states are competing only to attract residents willing to remain in the state”).

⁴¹ Martha E. Ertman, *Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction*, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2001).

⁴² Some commentators see the marriage geographic monopoly as a way states can impose costs on couples, thereby discouraging imprudent marriages. See Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, *From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law*, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1172 (2000) (“States use marriage law to define the types of relationships they want to encourage through subsidies, as distinguished from those they wish to discourage both by not conferring subsidies and even by criminal penalties. Accordingly, a state’s liberal marriage law might help the local tourist trade but impose costs where the couple returns to live. There is also a somewhat greater justification for state paternalism given the emotional nature of the decision, its significance to the married couple, and the absence of efficient markets to discipline choice of marriage partners.”). They have not taken the next step—recognizing the efficiencies that could be gained from eliminating the geographic monopoly while, at the same time, through internet communications and information gathering, potentially further “paternalistic” state goals.

⁴³ Corporate codes made a transition starting in the early twentieth century from being regulatory, based on a concession theory of the corporation, to an enabling philosophy. See Stanley A. Kaplan, *Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy*, 21 VAND. L. REV. 433, 433 (1968) (explaining that “[d]uring the past half century, the state corporation statute has in large measure been transformed from a device to control, restrict, and govern the corporations chartered under it into an enabling act granting to enterprisers the relatively unrestricted opportunity to devise the type of entity which they desire.”); Elvin R. Latty, *Why are Business Corporations Largely “Enabling”?* 50 CORNELL L. Q. 599 (1965).

⁴⁴ *Id.*

Breaking states' geographic monopoly on marriage would give states greater incentive to experiment. They can require that both parties be present in one location, perhaps with a local notary. Or they can permit marriages of any two people anywhere on the globe, subject to whatever precautions they choose. Or, they could outsource marriage to private firms that could provide the efficient and convenient service within parameters set by the state. Taking advantage of these experiments, individuals could choose the legal forms of marriage they like best rather than be forced to use those rooted in the jurisdiction in which they are physically present. Internet teleconferencing and other modern communications technology allow individuals to have a transformed "legal experience,"⁴⁵ of marriage, just as these technologies have transformed corporate deal closings. These changes in the way we live (and live the law) render such remote marriage or "e-marriage" ceremonies far more emotionally effective (and affective) than earlier effort at distance marriage, like proxy and letter marriage, making e-marriage a desirable alternative to solemnization tied to a physical place.

More broadly, e-marriage can fulfill Richmond and Hall's vision of a rational marriage authorization policy. She wanted marriage law to protect young girls and their virginity,

⁴⁵ See, e.g., Lynn Ashby, *From Russia With Love*, H Texas Online (Sept. 2003), <http://www.htexas.com/feature.cfm?Story=162>. That a marriage ceremony, without the exportable legal incidents, is valued is demonstrated by the space wedding conducted under Texas law between an American citizen in Houston and a Russian cosmonaut in space, *id.* The marriage was valid in Texas when solemnized but was not valid in Russia, *id.* The ceremony took place with the bride in a white gown, with music and flowers, and the groom present from space on a drop screen in a NASA conference room, *id.* It was reported as "a standard American wedding," *id.* Nonetheless, the marriage was to be re-solemnized in Russia in a Russian Orthodox wedding after the cosmonaut's return to Earth, *id.* See also *Live Internet Weddings Changes the Way Guests Attend Weddings*, E-releases.com (March 13, 2007), <http://www.ereleases.com/pr/live-internet-weddings-changes-the-way-guests-attend-weddings-9405> (noting that the Starwood Hotel in Hawaii recognized the need for telecasting of wedding ceremonies to guests who could not attend) ("[P]erhaps the most valuable service Live Internet Weddings provides is not professional videography or even a live wedding Webcast. Perhaps its value is more intangible, more easily measured in shared memories made possible through the marriage of art and technology."); ("Family and friends unable to attend can now watch from the comfort of home on a computer or by being connected to a big screen TV.."); Viva Las Vegas Wedding Chapel, http://www.vivalasvegasweddings.com/live_internet_weddings.htm, (visited February 22, 2009) ("Your friends and family can view your nuptials from any location worldwide, live, on our Viva Las Vegas Wedding Chapel Streaming Web-Cams (click graphic icons below to view one of four locations). ("Our live Internet wedding streams are broadcast free!") (sells internet marriages that lack legal standing: the effort is to sell fantasy weddings that can take place over the internet).

common concerns among progressives of her time but which now seem a bit outdated.⁴⁶ Our concerns are different. We want to expand the possibilities of marriage, both substantive and procedural. At the same time, we could see a role for *greater* governmental oversight. For example, government might wish greater regulation to oversee fraudulent foreign marriages—a problem which internet communications may facilitate, and which state designed e-marriage options might address.

Finally, we stress, however, that if Louisiana would not recognize a Vermont same-sex marriage or if Vermont does not recognize a Louisiana covenant marriage, these jurisdictions would be under no obligation to do so under the public policy exception in choice-of-law and DOMA.⁴⁷ One might ask if there are any practical or legal benefits to entering a marriage that one's state will not recognize. The answer is that if DOMA should expire, either by repeal or by constitutional infirmity, same-sex couples would gain the benefits of having a marriage recognized by the federal government. In addition, there is a potential benefit shared by the couple and the institution of civil marriage: to reduce the distance between official marriage law and the arrangements made by a couple that, in Professor Estin's words, "mimic" state marriage through unofficial religious or personal relationships.⁴⁸ There are costs (as well as benefits) to a parallel system of marriage that is produced by private arrangements, specifically uninformed spouses married in a religious marriage may believe themselves unfree to leave their putative spouse or be misled into believing she has enforceable marital rights.⁴⁹ Having a menu of marriages available from the several states might encourage a couple to write enforceable

⁴⁶ RICHMOND & HALL, *supra* note 2, at 337.

⁴⁷ The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. 7 (“(i)n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress...the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”).

⁴⁸ Estin, *supra* note 13, at 478.

⁴⁹ Estin, *supra* note 13, at 470 (emphasizing the importance of commonly held marriage norms).

private arrangements that, rather than build marriage from the ground up, reconstruct the features of their marriage that is recognized in the marriage-creating state.

II. The History of Marriage: Consent, Government Sanction, and Licensing

One might accept marriage as a status good the efficient distribution of which requires couples to have the ability to choose the authorizing jurisdiction. One, however, could claim that this vision of marriage upsets traditional state prerogatives in regulating family law, in general, and matrimony, in particular. We show that e-marriage is consistent with state authority as well as centuries of history concerning marriage law.

Consider the maxim *lex loci celebrationis*. This legal rule holds that jurisdictions should rely on the law of the state in which the marriage was celebrated to determine its validity, except if a strong public policy exception exists. This principle applies to domestic recognition of marriages performed in other states,⁵⁰ as well as international recognition of marriages performed in other nation states.⁵¹ For example, Nebraska recognizes a marriage performed in

⁵⁰ Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 121 (1934).

⁵¹ E.G.L., *Polygamy and the Conflict of Laws* 32 YALE L. J. 471, 474 (1923) (“As regards marriage, our courts have said that under our conditions it is convenient to determine its validity according to the law of the place of celebration. In the case of foreign marriages also they appear to deem it expedient to apply the *lex loci celebrationis*.”); see generally O’Hara & Ribstein, *supra* note, at 1209 (“marriages are typically considered valid everywhere if they are valid in the state of celebration”). Some states have explicit statutory provisions that blend their marriage evasion law with the recognition afforded to marriages under the principle of *lex loci celebrationis*. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. 46b-28 (“All marriages in which one or both parties are citizens of this state, celebrated in a foreign country, shall be valid, provided (1) Each party would have legal capacity to contract such marriage in this state and the marriage is celebrated in conformity with the law of that country.”) Massachusetts has a stand-alone marriage statute that declares void evasive marriages. MASS. GEN. LAWS. Ch. 10. It also has an elaborate statute allowing for a person who was a Massachusetts resident at the time of a foreign marriage ceremony, if later residing anywhere in the United States, to file evidence of the marriage with the clerk or registrar of the town where the person was domiciled at the time of the foreign marriage ceremony. Mass. Section 36. This seems to be a convenience that allows for transferring to an American state, Massachusetts, the official record of a marriage that might lack for good record keeping outside the country. The provision is not a *lex loci celebrationis* provision, which Massachusetts was not moved to restate in statute but seemingly assumes as a given. Rather, it functions as an offer by Massachusetts to serve in retrospect as the official “host” of the marriage solemnization. It has some echoes of our proposal, in that Massachusetts perceived the need of its marriage procedure—its record keeping—to be made available for those who married outside the Commonwealth. Our proposal has the merit of making it possible for a ceremony of marriage performed anywhere in the world by an American citizen to be an official act in

California under valid California law and procedure, even though Nebraska specifies different procedures for valid marriage. On the other hand, Nebraska does not recognize a California same-sex marriage, or a Saudi Arabian polygamous marriage, under the public policy exception.

The *lex loci celebrationis* maxim contains a certain syllogism: If marriage is validly performed in X jurisdiction, then Y jurisdiction must recognize it. However, committing the logical error of negating the antecedent, many in the debate, either implicitly or explicitly, draw an erroneous corollary: If a marriage performed in X is not valid and authorized in X, then Y jurisdiction must *not* recognize it—even if the marriage would be a valid marriage if performed in Y. For the many lulled by this faulty reasoning, jurisdictions’ *power* is only to determine what constitutes a valid marriage if performed within its borders and, as a corollary, it has no power to authorize marriages anywhere else.⁵²

This corollary is wrong on more than mere formal, logical grounds. First, states have historically have never assumed marriage as a matter of exclusive regulatory control. The history of marriage licensing, despite the confusing term “license”⁵³ which suggests state regulatory control, is a story of religious heterogeneity and state reception towards a multitude of

an American state, with its attendant public record keeping. We note, in addition, that our proposal can also support improved state record keeping of marriages, as well as the compilation of comprehensive statistics on patterns of marriage.

⁵² Letter of Bill Pryor, Attorney General of Alabama (by Carol Jean Smith, Chief, Opinions Division) to The Honorable Frank H. Riddick, Judge of Probate, Madison County Courthouse, Huntsville, Alabama, March 19, 1999 (advising addressee that “Alabama lacks any authority to license activities that occur outside her borders...” and a “ceremony performed [using an Alabama marriage license] in Tennessee was not a valid solemnization under Alabama law.”).

⁵³ The Massachusetts marriage code avoids using the term “license,” instead providing for the filing of “a notice of intention of marriage” and calling for a certificate signed by the clerk or registrar “specifying the date when notice was filed with him and all the facts relative to the marriage which are required by law to be ascertained and recorded...” Mass. Section 28. Massachusetts’s statutory usage recognizes linguistically the party control over the marriage and the role of the state as a facilitator, recorder, and source of publicity: the state code treats the marital formalization as something like the filing of a copyright or a land title than like an application for a patent. While the state enforces some outside limits on providing the certificate, they are the extreme instances of tender age and being party to an existing marriage.

marriage solemnization rituals, particularly in the United States. Second, states have always authorized and sanctioned marriage performed outside of their geographic borders through such mechanisms as proxy, mail, and telephone marriages. The following examines the history of licensing under Anglo-American law, showing that the state has never assumed exclusive regulatory authority over marriage. This section then examines state power to approve marriages outside its borders.

A. The Emergence of Licensing in England

Throughout the Middle Ages and into early modern Europe, both civil and ecclesiastical law recognized that a valid marriage did not require any type of church ceremony or state involvement.⁵⁴ Following established teaching, both the Church and the state recognized that mere stated consent of the parties creates a marriage or, to be legally precise, consent made in the present tense (*per verba de praesenti*) in contrast to words expressing a future intention to marry.⁵⁵

While marriage *per verba de praesenti* was valid, it was considered “clandestine” or “irregular.” In contrast, the Church had long-established rules specifying the

⁵⁴ See LYNN D. WARDLE & LAURENCE C. NOLAN, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW 141(2002); R.B. OUTHWAITE, CLANDESTINE MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500-1850 at 2 (1995) (“Consent in the present tense was almost universally accepted by canonists after the late 1180s as the critical test of whether a marriage existed or not,” quoting J.A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY 268-69(1987) (“This was the official view echoed in later civil law and it was supported by the common law . . . [as evidenced by] Chief Justice Holt’s judgment in *Collins v. Jesson* in 1704 that ‘if a contract be *per verba de praesenti*, it amounts to an actual marriage which the very parties themselves cannot dissolve by release or other mutual agreement, for it is as such a marriage in the sight of God as if it had been *in facie ecclesiae*,’ citing English Reports, 191, p. 671.”); Rev. Joseph N. Perry, *The Canonical Concept of Marital Consent: Roman Law Influences*, 25 CATH. LAW. 228, 233 (1980) (“From this point on [the reign of Pope Alexander III in the 12th century] it became a matter of church doctrine that, at the most fundamental level, consent alone creates Christian marriage *in jure*.”).

According to Outhwaite, common lawyers encouraged by the Statute of Frauds of 1677 began to insist upon some writing in proof of marriage. *Id.* at 3.

⁵⁵ John E. Semonche, *Common-Law Marriage in North Carolina: A Study in Legal History*, 9 AM. J. OF LEGAL HISTORY 320, 321 (1965).

ceremony for sanctioned or regular marriage. The Fourth Lateran Council in 1215⁵⁶ officially set forth the “triple calling of banns” i.e. the wedding was announced at Church on the three Sundays prior to the marriage. (Banns had hitherto been traditional in many Christian countries).⁵⁷ The Church set forth other requirements, such as stipulations concerning where and when marriages should take place, registration of marriage, and parental consent for marriages of minors.⁵⁸ The ceremony, itself, had to be performed by a priest, in the presence of witnesses—and it had to be performed during certain days and times.⁵⁹ Individuals had to swear to matters concerning appropriate age and/or parental consent and provide a security bond.⁶⁰

Clandestine marriage created opportunities for bigamy and even incestuous marriage, which calling of the banns was meant to counter. Perhaps more important, clandestine marriage disrupted inheritance, as children could marry without parental consent or even their parents’ knowledge.⁶¹ Both civil and ecclesiastical law, while accepting marriage *per verba de praesenti*, treated it less favorably than properly sanctioned marriage. Indeed, both church and state actively discouraged clandestine marriage. In England, “more than thirty sets of canons and diocesan statutes attempted to ensure that English marriages were conducted in ways that the church approved of.”⁶² Most severe, “those not marrying in the approved manner, and those who assisted them, were liable to punishments that ranged from repeated whippings to

⁵⁶ *Id.*

⁵⁷ OUTHWAITE, *supra* note 54, at 4.

⁵⁸ *Id.*

⁵⁹ Rebecca Probert, *Control over Marriage in England and Wales, 1753-1823: The Clandestine Marriages Act of 1753 in Context*, LAW & HISTORY REV. (2009).

⁶⁰ *Id.*, citing THE ANGLICAN CANONS, 1529–1947 (Gerald Bray, ed., Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1998), Canons 101, 102, and 103.

⁶¹ *Id.* at 6.

⁶² OUTHWAITE, *supra* note 54, at 5.

excommunication.”⁶³ Similarly, English civil law treated marriages solemnized irregularly at a disadvantage. For instance, the common lawyers, fearing that any woman could claim a secret marriage with a recently deceased man, forbade women not married in a legal church wedding from enjoying full inheritance rights.⁶⁴

. The Council of Trent in 1564 abolished recognition of clandestine marriage in all Catholic countries, requiring all legitimate ecclesiastical marriage to be performed before a priest and with witnesses.⁶⁵ The Council grandfathered existing irregular marriage--an early example of legal presumption in favor of existing countries.⁶⁶ In Catholic countries, this shift in ecclesiastical law ended further irregular marriage and any civil recognition of such marriages.⁶⁷

Because Henry VIII broke with the Catholic Church in the 1530s, several decades before the Council of Trent, England never adopted the Council of Trent’s reforms and only eliminated clandestine marriage in 1753 with passage of the Hardwicke Act.⁶⁸ Clandestine marriage persisted, therefore, in England for two centuries, existing alongside regular Church marriage which took place according to the ecclesiastical law of the Anglican Church.⁶⁹

Many couples, seeking to marry legitimately within the Church, sought to escape banns’ residency and publication burdens. From at least the 14th century, bishops in England did grant licenses, permitting marriage without banns.⁷⁰ Presumably using his judgment and knowledge

⁶³ *Id.*

⁶⁴ *Id.* at 5, *citing* F. POLLOCK & F.W. MAITLAND, *THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW* 374 (2nd ed. 1989).

⁶⁵ *Id.*

⁶⁶ The Council of Trent, The Twenty-Fourth Session, The Canons and Decrees of the Sacred and Oecumenical Council of Trent, (Ed. & trans., J. Waterworth, London: Dolman, 1848)) at 192-232 (available at <http://history.hanover.edu/texts/trent.html>).

⁶⁷ *See* Perry, *supra* note 54, at 229-32.

⁶⁸ OUTHWAITE, *supra* note 54, at 5; see Geo. II, c. 33 (1754).

⁶⁹ OUTHWAITE, *supra* note 54, at 5.

⁷⁰ Patrick McGrath, “Notes on the History of Marriage Licenses,” xx, xi *in* GLOUCESTER MARRIAGE ALLEGATIONS 1627-1680 (B. Firth, ed.). While McGrath notes that “the first canonical enactment . . . seems to be the eleventh canon of the Synod of Westminster in 1200, when it was ordered that no marriage should be contracted without banns being thrice published in the church, except by special authority of the bishop”, it appears that there is no historical record of licenses, in fact, being granted until the 14th century. *Id.* at xx fn.4.

of his own parishioner's status, truthfulness, and respectability, the Bishop or his delegate would issue a marriage license. Typically, the bishops would only have power to issue licenses within their bishopric or diocese. Ecclesiastical law on licensing in England continued to develop after the split from Rome.⁷¹

The 1753 Hardwicke Act ended legal recognition of clandestine marriage in England, giving civil recognition only to "regular" marriage performed according to Anglican ecclesiastical law as it then existed, i.e., through either banns or licenses. Only a Bishop and those vested with his authority could provide licenses.⁷² In addition, a couple could obtain a special license from a bishop, which would allow marriage anywhere within the bishopric, or from the Archbishop of Canterbury, which would allow one to marry anywhere in the Kingdom. These "special licenses" had some social cachet due to their expense and the status they conveyed.⁷³ Interestingly, the Act made exceptions for Jews, Quakers, and the royal family, groups that either could not marry in an Anglican church or, as with the royal family, had marriages that for political reasons had to be more flexible, requiring, at times, marriage by proxy or outside the country.⁷⁴ Catholics and dissenters were not exempted, an artifact of anti-

⁷¹The Dispensations Act of 1534 confirmed the rights of the Archbishop of Canterbury to issue licenses. *Id.* at xxi, *citing* 25 Henry VIII, c. 21, clauses ix-x. In the reign of King James I, the Convocation of Canterbury systematized Church law and set forth Canons 101-104, which formalize ecclesiastical law on marriage and licensing. Canon 101 allows only those with "episcopal authority," i.e., a bishop or his delegate, to issue a license. It appears as if the authority to sanction marriage was limited to the "exercising of right Episcopal jurisdiction." 6 THE ANGLICAN CANONS 1529-1947, Canon 101 at 401 (Ed., G. Bray 1998). In addition, "persons only as be of good state and quality" and only "upon good caution and security taken" could receive licenses. *Id.*

⁷² Geo. II., c. 33, cl. 17-18.

⁷³ *Id.* at sec. sec. 6; *see also* JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE & PREJUDICE, Chapter XVII of Volume III (Chap. 59) (Mrs. Bennet to Elizabeth upon recently hearing of her marriage to Darcy: "'My dearest child,'" she cried, 'I can think of nothing else! Ten thousand a year, and very likely more! 'Tis as good as a Lord! And a special licence. You must and shall be married by a special licence. But my dearest love, tell me what dish Mr. Darcy is particularly fond of, that I may have it tomorrow.'").

⁷⁴ Geo. II., c. 33, cl. 17-18. Interestingly, when Germany and Italy adopted national codes governing marriage solemnization, they also make exemptions for their ruling houses. *See* Lorenzen..

Catholic bias not remedied until the 19th century.⁷⁵ Anglo-American law has long used marriage law to discriminate against minorities.

The point of this historical discussion to our argument is twofold. First, marriage was never purely religious or state-based. While the term “license” suggests a state regulatory function, the license was originally an expression of religious, not state, authority.⁷⁶ The state-granted license later assumed a central function in the regulation of marriage, prohibiting interracial marriage and controlling venereal disease (While the form of license remains, its original state regulatory purposes (bigamy, incest) as well as its later purposes (venereal disease, interracial marriage) are now obsolete.) Licensing shows the regulation of marriage under common law constituted a complicated response between state and church, not primarily the domain of either.

Second, as the license evolved into a vehicle for state regulation of marriage, there emerged a conventional legal assumption (still much with us) that the state has regulatory authority over marriage based on geographic boundaries, just as a bishop’s authority was limited to his dioceses.⁷⁷ The preceding discussion debunks this idea. Under the Hardwicke Act, the

⁷⁵ In the 1830s, Parliament passed bills allowed justices of the peace to license marriage and eliminated the Anglican’s monopoly on religious solemnization. Parliament, however, maintained Church authority to marry by banns. OUTHWAITE, *supra* note 54, at 164.

⁷⁶ See Mary Anne Case, Arnold I. Shure Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School, at the 2004-2005 William B. Lockhart Lecture presented at the University of Minnesota Law School, Marriage Licenses, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 1758, 1765 (2005) (“I will do this in part by drawing analogies to the licensing the state provides for the drivers of automobiles and the owners of dogs and, most importantly, to its provision of corporate charters. In all four of these cases, the underlying activities involved could be and were at times carried on without state involvement, but the state at one point asserted monopoly control over licensing and, because, *inter alia*, of efficiency advantages from its involvement, the state is unlikely to retreat completely from the field.”).

Contrary to Professor Case, marriage *always* involved the state. The Roman *conubium* was, of course, a legal status that the state defined. In England, the state and civil law never followed Church law in a rote manner; rather, it recognized aspects of Church law, ignoring others—for instance, its refusal to grant inheritance rights to widows of clandestine marriages. Conversely, the state has never, at least in the United States, exercised exclusive authority over marriage, as religious communities through banns and other forms of legal forms, exercised much authority as well.

⁷⁷ See Mark R. Poirier, *Gender, Place, Discursive Space: Where is Same-Sex Marriage?*, 3 FLORIDA INT’L U. L. REV. 307, 327 (2008) (asking “Where is same-sex marriage?” and providing several geographic answers, including “Massachusetts, Connecticut, and until recently California” and “[m]uch of Western Europe”).

English parliament chose to recognize marriages performed in a certain way, *i.e.*, with banns or Church licensed; it did not suggest that its power to authorize marriage was limited to its borders. To the degree the license has emerged as a lever for state regulation of marriage, a story we discuss below, the license cannot be seen as an expression of geography-based regulatory authority.

B. Marriage Solemnization in the United States

The American colonies were, with the exception of Georgia, founded in the 17th Century, a time during which English marriage law was in flux, with clandestine marriage still recognized but its precise legal status unclear. As a result, the colonies had freedom to craft laws to suit their own religion and social structure. Because the 1753 Hardwicke Act did not apply to the English possessions overseas (or Scotland or Ireland), the American colonies maintained that freedom until the Revolution.⁷⁸ Even more important, the traditional, Anglican form of “regular” marriage simply did not make sense in the colonies. After all, many of the colonists, like New England’s Puritans or Pennsylvania’s Quakers, were colonists *because* they did not want to be Anglican, a desire that they fervently, even fanatically, felt. Their religious and political disposition led them to reject the Anglican form of solemnization. With the presence of a priest, a church wedding appeared too close to the Catholic sacrament of marriage. Further, even colonists who lacked hostility towards the Anglican Church faced the practical problem that in the newly and sparsely populated colonies there often were no Anglican clergy available to solemnize marriages.

The colonies, therefore, devised diverse legal solutions to the challenge of creating “regular” marriages in a variety of ways that differed according to their religious and social

⁷⁸ Hardwicke Act, Geo. II., c. 33, sec. 18.

organization. A standard history of marriage states, “The continuity of English law and custom in the New England colonies is not more striking than the innovation.”⁷⁹ For instance, the Puritans of Massachusetts, likely reacting against the Catholic view of marriage as a sacrament, argued that marriage needed no priestly intermediary.⁸⁰ Influenced by the example of Dutch practice, their previous residence, the Puritans of Massachusetts Bay introduced strictly civil marriage which involved an appearance before a judge.⁸¹ This minimal legal moment dominated New England, as every colony viewed “marriage . . . as a civil contract and the celebration was performed by a civil magistrate.”⁸² There was also a requirement that the

⁷⁹ II GEORGE ELLIOT HORWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS 125 (1904, reprinted 1964).

⁸⁰ We find far-fetched the assertion that Puritan contractual weddings were in any way related to New England’s current liberal marriage regimes. See Case, *supra* note 76, at 1794 (“In Puritan New England, by contrast to the rest of the United States, members of the clergy came late into participation in the licensing of marriage. . . Marriage in New England was from the start a civil contract solemnized by a civil magistrate,. . . It is tempting to see some connection between this history and New England’s vanguard role in the state licensing of same-sex couples”).

Rather, aversion to the Catholic view that marriage was a sacrament no doubt drove the form of Puritan marriage. Further, it is a mistake to claim that the Puritans, in fact, saw marriage as a private “civil contract.” To the contrary, the Puritans believed in strict state control over marriage. As an early commentator said, although the Puritans regarded marriage as a “purely a civil contractual relation,” they insisted that it “be regulated by municipal law [and] be sanctioned by the civil authority.” II GEORGE ELLIOT HORWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS 210 (1904, reprinted 1964), citing SHIRLEY, “Early Jurisprudence of New Hampshire, *Prccds. New Hamp. Hist. Soc.* (1876-84). Indeed, there are instances of the purely contractual clandestine marriages, and the Puritan state punished them. Perhaps most famously, Governor Richard Bellingham in 1641 secretly married Penelope Pelham and was indicted for the offense. See *id.* at 210. In other words, even though there was ecclesiastic law determining valid marriage in the Church’s eyes, the state always had to choose what parts of ecclesiastical law were required for a valid marriage in the State’s eyes

⁸¹ *Id.* at 134. Governor Hutchinson states of the Puritans “I believe there was no instance of marriage by a clergyman after they arrived, during their charter; but it was always done by a magistrate, or by persons specially appointed for that purposes. It is difficult to assign a reason for so sudden a change, especially as there was no established form of the marriage covenant.” II HUTCHINSON, HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETTS at 392. In light of this religious reason for rejecting Church marriage, it seems a bit fantastical to claim that

⁸² II GEORGE ELLIOT HORWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS at 128-34 (“The law and custom of the other New England colonies were essentially the same. Everywhere marriage was regarded as a civil contract and the celebration was performed by a civil magistrate.”). We think it a mistake to view Puritan marriage as a private contract, as some modern advocates of contract-based marriage suggest. As we discuss *infra*, Puritan marriage rejected the Catholic view that marriage was a sacrament but always insisted upon strict state control.

It is worth noting that in the 1680s, King James II established greater control over New England to limit Puritan influence, creating the “Dominion of New England.” ALAN TAYLOR, AMERICAN COLONIES: SETTING OF NORTH AMERICA 276-82 (2001). As part of this anti-Puritan power grab, James’ royal governor attempted to require that Anglican clergy perform all marriages so that “the laws requiring civil marriage were set aside.” II GEORGE ELLIOTT HORWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS at 135. This ineffectual “reform” faced the practical difficulty that there were few Anglican clergyman in the colonies and ended with the Dominion’s demise in the early 1690s.

marriage be publically announced and registered.⁸³ The strict Protestant secularization of marriage softened in the 18th Century, with legal reforms, started in 1686, allowing both judicial and religious authorities to perform marriages.⁸⁴

The Middle Colonies, which lacked the Puritan hostility to Church weddings, took a different course—but one that differed from English ecclesiastical law then in force. New York, originally a Dutch colony, following a modified Dutch model, allowed either religious or civil ceremonies. When the British took over, their government imposed a regime similar to the pre-existing Dutch approach, permitting celebration of marriage before a minister or justice of the peace.⁸⁵ In the Quaker proprietary colonies of Pennsylvania and Delaware, law reflected the Quaker custom of permitting any type of religious ceremony but requiring public notice followed by a witnessed marriage ceremony and subsequent registration with a county registrar.⁸⁶ Several southern colonies, in significant part and contrast to the liberal policies of the Middle Colonies, adopted rules similar to the 1753 Hardwicke Act in England. In Virginia, all marriages had to be solemnized by an Anglican minister, a rule in force until after the Revolution. Marriage ceremonies could be performed after publication or license, which the Governor was empowered to issue.⁸⁷ North Carolina had a similar rule giving the marriage monopoly to Anglican minister, a rule that was controversial, of course, among Dissenters, i.e. non-Anglican Protestants.

Because English marriage law was in flux during the 17th Century, the American colonies had to improvise, adopting certain English customs yet changing them significantly. Except in a

⁸³ *Id.* at 144.

⁸⁴ II GEORGE ELLIOT HORWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS at 135; Richmond & Hall, *supra* note 2, at 92.

⁸⁵ II GEORGE ELLIOT HORWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS at 294.

⁸⁶ II GEORGE ELLIOT HORWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS 125.

⁸⁷ II GEORGE ELLIOT HORWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS 240-47.

few Southern colonies, no single or established Church ever established a monopoly on solemnization, as it did after 1753 in England.⁸⁸ Instead, because the colonists were creating legal forms *outside* existing religious institutions, often as with the Quakers and Puritans quite self-consciously, they could not turn to traditional legal solemnization. The Colonies created an American legal tradition of flexibility and adaptation to meet changing needs.

At the same time, it is worth noting that the early colonial laws never abandoned public ceremony. Even the pomp-averse Puritans and Quakers saw a need of public, government-sanctioned marriage ritual, including public notification and registry.⁸⁹ This suggests that societies always valued marriage as a public ceremony in the community—an insight useful to our economic theory of marriage discussed above.

C. From Banns as Enabling Regulation to Licenses as State Regulation

Throughout the 19th Century, state laws moved to a certain type of uniformity—a uniformity that characterizes current law, the features of which we discuss in Section III. While this process is by definition complex and heterogeneous as it involves legal evolution in the several states, certain generalizations are fair. Both civil and religious weddings are permitted. Restrictions on the denominations permitted to perform weddings are, of course, eliminated, as any duly ordained minister may perform weddings. The license has emerged as a fulcrum for

⁸⁸ It is important to remember that some colonies, and later states, had established churches. See Michael W. McConnell, *Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion*, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2110 (2003) (Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia recognized the Anglican Church, while Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Connecticut were Congregationalist (Puritan)).

⁸⁹ See Records of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay in New England, 1639, 7 mo 9 (“For preventing of all unlawful mariages, &c., it is ordered that, after duoe publication of this order, noe persons shall bee joined in marriage before the intention of the parties proceeding therein hath bene three times published at some time of publick lecture or towne meeting, in both the townes where the parties, or either of them do ordinarily reside; and in such townes where no lectures are, then the same intention to be set up in writing, upon some poast standing in public view and used for such purposes onely and there to stand, so as it may easily bee read by the space of fourteen days.”).

state regulation. At first the license prohibited interracial marriage. Now it aims to regulate same sex marriage.

Many of the colonies permitted marriage by licenses instead of banns, just as in England.⁹⁰ In the 19th Century, most state statutes eliminated banns or public announcement requirements and began to require licensing exclusively. We argue that banns constitute an enabling regulation, analogous to filing for a corporation, that provide precedent for e-marriage. Both allow individuals to attain a certain legal relationship, provided certain protocols are observed, with minimal government intervention—this is particularly true in the Quaker-influenced colonies in which *any* religious group could authorize marriage.⁹¹ Individuals controlled banns or public announcement in a way roughly analogous to filing for incorporation. Individuals determine the time and place, and the state provides an “off the rack” legal regime. States did not regulate directly through banns, but rather they permitted individuals with objections to the marriage to come forth—in a way roughly analogous to corporate self-government. Both banns and incorporation have limited regulatory goals, the former prohibiting bigamy and incest, the latter prohibiting duplication of trade names.

Licensing, on the other hand, was originally meant to make marriage more convenient for couples but became a tool states used to regulate marriage directly. The states seized the opportunity to transform the regulation of marriage from minimal self-enforcement to intrusive

⁹⁰ For example, in New York, marriage by “[l]icense ‘under the hand and seale of the governour’ in place of banns is still allowed.” II GEORGE ELLIOT HORWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS at 294.

⁹¹ Interestingly, many of the states licensed clergymen to perform weddings with little or no governmental oversight, particularly in states with Quaker influences. An authorized clergyman had the discretion to marry anyone, just as a congregation could through banns. This resulted in claims that certain states had become “Gretna Greens” in which unscrupulous clergymen married couples that were inappropriate (usually including very young girls) or otherwise imprudent. *See* Marriage Law, The New York Times, Nov. 15, 1880, at 4. (describing legal reform in New Jersey)

government control.⁹² States added requirements such as waiting times and blood tests for syphilis and refusing licenses on miscegenation grounds—greatly expanding the narrow regulation of marriage that had traditionally only involved bigamy, incest and publication.⁹³

The shift from banns to licensing permitted the state to change the character of marriage from one that is decentralized and delegated to communities, in which the state facilitated private enforcement through publication, to one which government directly regulates, allowing discriminatory miscegenation laws. Ironically, in modern times, the state has retreated from the areas the licenses regulated. Most prominently, the states (of course) no longer prohibit inter-racial marriage. Most states have dropped, or decreased, venereal diseases testing. Further, while the Las Vegas wedding is hardly the norm, waiting periods have decreased. In short, states' basis for licensing has largely evaporated, yet it persists as the dominant legal form regulating marriage for no good reason other than historical.

Failing to recognize this distasteful history, commentators believe that marriage solemnization was *always* or primarily a state regulatory franchise.⁹⁴ It clearly was *not*. Rather, it was an essentially a private arrangement that required some public sanction which also served to facilitate private enforcement of rights—a highly valued status good as we discuss below. Geographic assumptions about licensing reinforced the regulatory view of marriage. Recall that a priest or minister could legally license marriages within his parish. This limitation logically proceeds from the fact that licenses served to replace banns, which, in turn, allowed people in the community to object to the marriage primarily on the grounds of bigamy. Parish

⁹² The elimination of banns was slow but inexorable. In 1929, Richmond and Hall counted 3 states that still permitted banns, Maryland, Ohio, and South Carolina. See MARY E. RICHMOND & FRED S. HALL, MARRIAGE AND THE STATE 137 at 337 n. 1 (1929). Other states eliminated banns earlier: Massachusetts in 1850, see The New Marriage Law, 29 Christian Register 17, Apr. 27, 1850; Connecticut in 1855, see *New Marriage Law in Connecticut*, German Reformed Messenger, Jan. 17, 1855, at 4230; New Hampshire in 1854. see The Marriage Laws of New Hampshire, Home Journal, Oct. 21, 1854 at 4

⁹³ NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 28-33 (2000).

⁹⁴ THALER & SUNSTEIN, *supra* note 14 **Error! Bookmark not defined.**, at 184-9.

priests could serve this regulatory role only in the community in which they had knowledge—
their own.

Banns, like e-marriage, empowered entities other than the domiciliary states to authorize weddings. The state’s role in the legal creation of marriage resembles its role in incorporation, which may be offered to citizens of any state and for which physical presence within a state is not required. Indeed, as discussed below, courts have realized this. They have recognized as valid proxy marriages, telephone marriage, and marriages in which individuals use licenses issued by one state but solemnize their union in another. It is to these types of marriages we now turn. On a more profound level, the use and persistence of banns, particularly in colonies like Pennsylvania in which there was no established Church, suggests a serious reconsideration of the typical claim that marriage is an exclusive matter of state control.⁹⁵

D. Distance Marriages

1. Proxy Marriage

Proxy demonstrates the perennial need for both ritual and flexibility in marriage solemnizing. As mentioned above, canon law recognized it and continues to do so,⁹⁶ and it was practiced among the royalty and nobility of Europe.⁹⁷ We are not aware of a scholarly

⁹⁵ *United States v. Lopez*, 514 U.S. 549, 554 (1995) (“But it seems to me that the power to regulate ‘commerce’ can by no means encompass authority over mere gun possession, any more than it empowers the Federal Government to regulate marriage, littering, or cruelty to animals, throughout the 50 States. Our Constitution quite properly leaves such matters to the individual States. . .”).

⁹⁶ Canon 1089 §§ 1-4. According to Cahill, the Roman Catholic Church recognizes proxy marriage. The principal must write, if possible, explicitly giving his or her proxy authority to marry. This commission must be made before the pastor, other Church functionary, or two witnesses. William F. Cahill, *Historical Notes on the Canon Law on Solemnized Marriage*, 2 CATH. LAW. 108, 109 fn. 3 (1956). Pomponius, digest, XXII, 2, 5, cited in Lorenzen at 473.

⁹⁷ For instance, Clovis with Clotilde, Joanna of Navarre with Henry IV of England, Anne of Brittany with Archduke Maximilian, Margaret of Anjou with Henry VI of England, Princess Anne with James I of England, Queen Mary Tudor with Philip II of Spain, and Napoleon and Marie-Louise. High nobility sometimes used proxy marriage as well, as with the Duke of York marrying Mary Beatrice of Modena in 1673 T.F. THISELTON-DYER,

explanation of why European royalty was so attached to this form of solemnizing marriage. We speculate that proxy marriage provided greater flexibility for political maneuver; as such marriages were de facto political alliances.⁹⁸ Regardless of the reasons for proxy marriages, European governments appear to have been attached to them, keeping them legal for royalty even as they made them illegal for everyone else. In the late 19th century, when Germany and Italy united and promulgated national civil codes, their marriage law provision set forth mandatory marriage procedures prohibiting proxy marriage, but both codes explicitly exempted their royal houses. Similarly, the 1754 Hardwicke Act exempted the royal family from its mandatory procedure. It seems at least likely that these exemptions sprang from the need to perform for political purposes royal marriages abroad and perhaps a need to keep proxy marriage available to royalty.⁹⁹

The form has persisted in the United States in four states, for unclear reasons. Several states still permit it but mainly extend it to members of the armed services on active duty.¹⁰⁰ Three states—California, Montana, and Texas extend the privilege of single proxy marriage to members of the Armed Services on active duty (California requires an armed conflict) without regard to their being a resident of the state.¹⁰¹ Montana permits its double proxy marriage

ROYALTY IN ALL AGES: THE AMUSEMENTS, ECCENTRICITIES, ACCOMPLISHMENTS, SUPERSTITIONS, AND FROLICES OF THE KINDS AND QUEENS OF EUROPE 310-14 (1903).

⁹⁸ A proxy marriage could be easily annulled for lack of consummation permitting parties to back out of deal if necessary. Indeed, the historical record is filled with several such annulments. Further, proxy marriages could be performed immediately, without the time consuming preparations and elaborate ceremonies that royal weddings perform required. They could “seal a deal” immediately, if political exigencies so required.

⁹⁹ It is worth noting that proxy marriages for the British royal house continued after the passage of the Hardwicke Act of 1753, with, for example, the marriage the Duke of York and Albany (with Lord Malmesbury as proxy) to Princess Frederica Charlotte of Prussia in 1791.

¹⁰⁰ See supra note 7.

¹⁰¹ See supra note 7.

provision to be used if one member of the couple is a resident of Montana.¹⁰² Montana's greater liberalism may be a result of its history of all-male mining camps.

In addition, courts have recognized proxy marriage for immigration status. For instance, a federal district court recognized, for immigration purposes, a proxy marriage between a New York resident and a resident of Spain in the case, *Aznar v. Commissioner of Immigration* under the *lex loci celebrationis maxim*.¹⁰³

Proxy marriage is an early demonstration that presence within a geographic boundary is a legal habit that can be, has been, and continues to be dispensed with. The *only* argument for geographic presence is the state's interest in preventing impetuous or improvident marriage—and thus physical presence and licensing procedure furthers this interest. However, as discussed below, e-marriage could encompass any degree of procedural safeguards, ranging from submission of physician or psychologist affidavits to waiting periods. Geographic presence need not protect this state interest. As U.S. District Judge Lowell said in the *Aznar* case, “If royalty could do it, why may not those of more common clay be allowed to follow their example.”¹⁰⁴

2. Picture marriages.

Proxy marriages show that marriage ceremonies need not be performed in the jurisdiction that authorizes them. Picture marriages, in contract, are an early example of how technology can change the geographic assumptions of how couples marry and they show how the critical legal moment of marriage can be decentered from geography and jurisdiction. During a period of high immigration by Japanese men to the United States, Japanese women came to the United States to

¹⁰² See *supra* note 7.

¹⁰³ *United States ex rel. v. Aznar v. Commissioner of Immigration*, 298 Fed. Rep. 102; *Ex parte Suzanna*, 295 Fed. Rep. 713.

¹⁰⁴ These marriages are listed in T.F. THISELTON-DYER, *ROYALTY IN ALL AGES: THE AMUSEMENTS, ECCENTRICITIES, ACCOMPLISHMENTS, SUPERSTITIONS,, AND FROLICES OF THE KINGS AND QUEENS OF EUROPE* 310-14 (1903).

enter pre-planned marriages upon arrival.¹⁰⁵ These marriages were arranged through the photographs or “pictures.”

An unusual type of ritual creates the picture marriage. Because a marriage involves heavy investments in travel by people of limited means, the legal acts that help to effectuate the marriage are, in fact, those that facilitate travel by one member of the intended marital couple.¹⁰⁶ The bride’s investment in travel, and the groom’s selection via picture, constitutes the critical “statements” by the parties agreeing to enter the marriage. The ceremony ratifies what has occurred.

As we discuss below, our proposal for marriage involves building upon the ancient form of proxy marriage through technologies like the internet. The picture marriage foreshadowed our proposal. Picture marriage is remarkably modern, demonstrating how technology can lower costs (here of marriage) and thereby increase choice and human options—just as our proposal for e-marriage would. First, a new technology, photography, allowed picture marriages. Interestingly, this use of technology had the potential to mislead, just as some surely would fear e-marriage might. The pictures could be made to make a woman look more beautiful or refined than she was. Just as in on-line social networking sites, technology permitted individuals to meet a greater number and variety of potential mates, but also created new dangers.

Second, picture marriages were socially transformative. They freed Japanese women from limitation by geography to access to marriage as a social good only within their own social milieu and allowed for transformation of the meaning of marriage by using technology to

¹⁰⁵ Kei Tanaka, *Japanese Picture Marriage and the Image of Immigrant Women in Early Twentieth-Century California*—this needs to be cited throughout this account

¹⁰⁶ Indeed, a critical legal act was the very legal authorization to enter the United States. See Todd Stevens, *Tender Ties: Husbands’ Rights and Racial Exclusion in Chinese Marriage Cases, 1882–1924*, 27 *LAW & SOC. INQUIRY* 271, 297 (2002) (indicating that the United States responded favorably to the need of immigrant males, given miscegenation laws, to the company of their wives,).

overcome a local monopoly on marriage. Women who used technology to enter picture marriages achieved practical goals (even where there was disappointment in the actual amount of practical gain) and symbolic gains. Japanese people used a flexible arrangement to achieve practical marital goals, not unlike European royalty's use of proxy marriage.

3. Absentee Marriage: Telephone and Mail Marriages

The strongest argument for e-marriage's legality is that it has occurred before with older technologies: telephone or mail marriage has occurred at various times in the United States. As with proxy marriages, the exigencies of war played a role in telephone marriage. Unfortunately, good statistics about the prevalence of telephone marriage are not available. We know it exists largely from newspaper and other accounts.¹⁰⁷

A law review article, written in 1946 describes the need of servicemen during World War II to have marriages validated when they could not be present. Beyond noting telephone marriage's prevalence, the article recognizes the normative argument for making marriage as accessible as possible: "When a state assumes the authority to prescribe the sole conditions under which its citizens may assume so basic a relation as that of marriage, it incurs the responsibility of making certain, in so far as possible, that the privilege of marrying is denied only by design, and not by inadvertence."¹⁰⁸

Other countries, during war time, explicitly authorized absentee marriage. The Belgian law of May 30, 1916, provides that "During the duration of the war either or both of the parties may appear before the officer of the civil status either in person or by a special and authentic power of

¹⁰⁷ Marriage by Telephone, NY Times (Feb. 21, 1890). Florida Marriage by Mail, <http://www.floridamarriagebylicensebyemail.com/>. Arizona Marriage by Mail, <http://www.mohavecourts.com/clerk/mlpage.htm>; California Phone Wedding for Active Duty Service, http://www.marriagetogo.com/text_content_page2.html#phone%20marriage; Recent story on marriage by phone with military service member: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32891829/ns/us_news-life/.

¹⁰⁸ *The Validity of Absentee Marriage of Servicemen*, 55 YALE L.J. 735 (1946).

attorney.”¹⁰⁹ France and Italy provided for similar laws.¹¹⁰ Similarly, as discussed *supra* many jurisdictions in the United States continue to recognize proxy marriage. It is worth noting that during World War II, Minnesota had a law authorizing proxy marriage.¹¹¹

The United States Court of Appeals upheld distance marriage conducted by letter in the celebrated case, *Great Northern Railway v. Johnson*.¹¹² There, the husband was from Minnesota and the wife from Missouri. Both states recognized at that time common law marriage, which required no formality or solemnization. It is arguable that *Great Northern Railway* did not reach the question of whether the state-required rituals could be performed distantly.

Edward Lorenzen argued during the end of the First World War, that proxy and distance marriage, would be legal in the United States. He shows that proxy marriage was perfectly legal in England prior to passage of the Hardwicke Act, citing *inter alia*, Swinburne’s Treatise on Espousals.¹¹³ Arguing (a bit heroically) that the American colonies “accepted the then prevailing view that a marriage *de presenti* without a religious ceremony constituted a perfect marriage,” Lorenzen argues that proxy marriage was part of the common law on marriage that the colonies adopted.

Regardless of their legality, telephone marriages were common during times of war. Commenters of the time collected instances of telephone marriages, giving the impression that they were somewhat common.¹¹⁴ While there were no cases challenging these weddings, there is

¹⁰⁹ MASSON, LA LEGISLATION DE GUERRE 146 (1917); Ernest G. Lorenzen, *Marriage by Proxy and the Conflict of Laws*, 32 HARV. L. REV. 473, 479 (1918). Interestingly, the Roman Catholic Church permits proxy marriage, as discussed above, but does not recognize (or at least at one time did not recognize) telephone marriage. See *Marriage By Phone Out, Rome Ruling Snags Romance of Italian Girl and G.I.*, *New York Times*, Feb. 9, 1958, at 27.

¹¹⁰ Lorenzen, *supra* 109, at 479, citing DUVERGIER, LA LÉGISLATION COMPLÈTE DES LOIS, ETC. (1915).

¹¹¹ Minn. Laws 1945, c. 409 (marriage proxy allowed for duration of war plus six months)

¹¹² 254 Fed. 683 (8th Cir. 1918) (1919).

¹¹³ Lorenzen, *supra* 109, at 418.

¹¹⁴ According to a student note written shortly after World War II, the most common means are proxy or telephone ceremonies, or contracts, signed by proxy or exchanged by mail. See *The Validity of Absentee Marriage of Servicemen*, 55 Yale L.J. 735 (1946), citing Reynolds, *Where There’s a Will There’s a Wedding*, N. Y. Sunday News, Sept. 3, 1944, pp. 23-

some case law concerning proxy marriages in Mexico, which servicemen and their spouses used in the hope that United States jurisdictions would recognize them. These cases generally upheld such marriage.¹¹⁵

In short, distance marriage, whether by mail or telephone, with or without proxy, has legal precedent in this country. This precedent's strength proceeds from the logic of marriage: it is essentially a party-driven agreement that the state sanctions and enables. Described this way, marriage obviously can be performed without both parties' physical presence in any one place. Geographic monopolies persist from legal inertia and lazy legal dogmatism.

4. Conclusions

The preceding historical analysis undercuts many assumptions about the marriage ceremony. First, lawful marriage solemnizing has not always required a couple's physical proximity to one another, or their joint presence in a marriage granting jurisdiction, for a marriage to be solemnized. This false assumption is prevalent throughout the legal literature, with respected hornbooks suggesting that distance marriage cannot be legal.¹¹⁶ More important to today's prospective spouses than dusty legal tomes, many websites for local marriage bureaus

9; O'Neill, *Most Married Man in America*, YANK, Oct. 5, 1945, p. 11 condensed in Reader's Digest, Dec. 1945, p. 75; Kan. City Star, Mar. 4, 1946, p. 3, col. 2 (attorney's 50th appearance as proxy in ceremony); N. Y. Times, July 29, 1945, § 4, p. 2, col. 7 (24th Tulsa proxy wedding). Sporadic instances of absentee marriage occurred in World War I. See N. Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1917, p. 7, col. 2 (telephone); id., June 1, 1918, p. 11, col. 4, and June 22, 1918, p. 9, col. 5 (telegraph). Interestingly, as the student note points out, the Judge Advocate General of the Army suggested advocated soldiers should have access to marriage by mail. *Id.* That same note pointed out that the Attorney General of Florida, while not recognizing the validity of common law, has ruled that marriage by telephone is valid. See Rep. Att'y Gen. 489 (1943-44)

¹¹⁵ *Hardin v. Davis*, 16 Ohio Supp. 19 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1945) ("Having found that the parties in the instant case intended to be and were legally married by proxy in Mexico, that there was no fraud in connection with their marriage, and that the resulting marriage status of the parties is not contrary to Ohio law or its public policy, the Court, therefore, finds, declares, orders and decrees that Laura Mae Hardin, the plaintiff, and Walter Lloyd Davis the defendant, were legally married at Juarez, Mexico, on May 8, 1944"); see generally A. Stern, *Marriages by Proxy in Mexico*, 19 So. C. L. 109 (1945).

¹¹⁶ *Marriage by Mail*, 32 Harv. L.Rev. 848, 852 (1918-1919) (citing *In re Lur Lin*, 59 Fed. 682, 683; I BISHOP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND SEPARATION, § 326. ("a state or country cannot impose a status [*i.e.* marriage] on a person who is neither domiciled nor present within its territorial limits."))

and clerk's offices recite the recurring and false assumption that a state may only license a marriage within its geographic borders.¹¹⁷

While we concede that states' have at times limited themselves to only authorizing marriages on their own soil (as only a notary authorized to be a notary by the marriage granting state¹¹⁸), nothing in the law of marriage broadly understood requires this result. And, as we discuss below, to the degree marriage is a good to which government must ensure efficient access, removing local limits would be optimal.

III. Jurisdiction, Place, and Marriage: The Current Law

The rules governing the creation and recognition of marriage involve four legal matters:

- 1) the procedure to get married (licenses, solemnization, etc.);
- 2) the consequences of a couple's making a procedural error under the licensing law of a state;
- 3) the substantive determination who is eligible to be married under the laws of a given state; and,
- 4) determining whether a marriage is valid in a state other than the marriage-granting state.

¹¹⁷ See Office of the City Clerk, Marriage FAQ, The City of New York, <http://www.cityclerk.nyc.gov/html/marriage/faq.shtml#married> (last visited Sept. 19, 2009) ("The contract must be signed by both parties and at least two witnesses and all signatures must be given within the State."); County Clerk, Marriage License Information, Clark County Nevada, http://www.accessclarkcounty.com/depts/clerk/Pages/marriage_information.aspx (last visited Sept. 19, 2009) ("In order to have a legal marriage, a ceremony must be performed in the State of Nevada within one year from date of issuance of the marriage license by any person licensed or authorized to perform ceremonies in Nevada."); Alachua County Clerk, Marriage Licenses, Alachua County Florida, <http://www.alachuacounty.us/government/clerk/famlaw/marriage.aspx> (last visited Sept. 19, 2009) ("Do both parties have to be present at the Clerk's office to apply for a license? Yes."). See also U.S.MarriageLaws.com, Question & Answer, http://www.usmarriagelaws.com/search/united_states/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2009) (providing a summary of each state's marriage laws and links to the state bureaus or clerk's offices).

¹¹⁸ See Performing Marriage Ceremonies: A Guide for Florida Notaries Public (1999) http://www.flgov.com/pdfs/wedding_handbook.pdf ("A Florida Notary may perform a marriage ceremony providing the couple first obtain a marriage license from an authorized Florida official and may only perform a ceremony within the geographical boundaries of Florida. Thus, a Florida Notary may not perform a marriage ceremony in another state.").

The din of public debate concerning same sex marriage and, to a much lesser degree, covenant marriage has revolved around the third requirement: who is qualified for marriage and what type of obligations and benefits does it confer.¹¹⁹ Because the fourth matter presents largely legal, as opposed to political questions, courts and academics have spilled the most ink over it, particularly after a few states began to recognize same sex marriage.

In contrast, the first two concerns – which revolve around procedure -- receive little attention. States have remarkably similar procedures, and they do not generate dispute. As far as the procedure governing marriage, states simply recognize as valid marriages that are valid in the jurisdiction, following the ancient legal maxim of *lex loci celebrationis*, discussed above.¹²⁰

As far as the legal consequences for failing to observe these procedures, for instance solemnizing their marriage in a state or county that their license does not authorize, courts are, as a rule, lenient. They typically overlook procedural imperfections and recognize such marriage on the public policy justification of favoring marriage.¹²¹ This was true even when the rules were intended for the protection of women.¹²² Nonetheless, the laws on the book strongly

¹¹⁹ Grossman, *supra* note 13, at 456.

¹²⁰ See footnote 58 and accompanying text.

¹²¹ *Barbosa-Johnson v. Johnson*, 851 P.2d 866 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (finding a valid marriage where the parties used an Arizona marriage license for a wedding taking place in Puerto Rico); *De Potty v. De Potty*, 295 S.W.2d 330 (Ark. 1956) (finding a valid marriage in Arkansas despite the use of a Texas marriage license); *Mc Peek v. Mc Cardle*, 888 N.E.2d 171 (Ind. 2008) (finding a valid marriage when the couple complied with the Indiana marriage laws even though the marriage was not performed in the state); *State v. Brem*, 178 P.2d 582 (N.M. 1947) (finding that despite having a license issued in New Mexico the marriage performed in Texas was valid either because the marriage license requirement in Texas is directory or because the couple fulfilled the elements of common law marriage while living in the state); *Maxwell v. Maxwell*, 273 N.Y.S.2d 728 (N.Y. 1966) (finding a valid marriage where couple used a New Mexico license to marry in California because there was solemnization by a Rabbi); *In re Compulsory Accounting in the Estate of Farraj*, 2009 WL 997481 (N.Y. Sur. 2009) (finding a marriage as valid under New York law based on the parties expectation and the solemnization ceremony despite the invalidity of the marriage in New Jersey where it was performed); *contra*/but see* *Kisla v. Kisla*, 19 S.E.2d 609 (W. Va. 1942) (refusing to find a valid West Virginia marriage where the couple had obtained and used a Pennsylvania marriage license but recognizing the couple's child as legitimate).

¹²² *Ely v. Gammel*, 52 Ala. 584 (Ala. 1875) (finding that a marriage is not void when the license used to solemnize the marriage was not issued by the female's home county); *Wallace v. Screws*, 149 So. 226 (Ala. 1923) (finding that failure to obtain a license from the female's home county does not render any subsequent marriage void for that reason); *People v. Lininger*, 71 P.2d 306 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937) (finding that failure to use a marriage license in the issuing county does not void the marriage); *Minshew v. State*, 102 S.E. 906 (Ga. Ct. App. 1920)

indeed, almost always, dictate to couples the options for organizing their wedding. It is arguably the case that couples follow the “rule book” with more fidelity than they did before social mores made marriage less critical for obtaining access to sexual intimacy.¹²³ Today, most couples are more likely to marry for the legal status, than for access to sexual intimacy.

At one time there was concern to establish uniform standards for marriage solemnization. The Uniform Marriage and Licenses Act, adopted in 1906, prescribed model provisions for marriage solemnization. It became a starting point for state laws governing marriage solemnization.¹²⁴ The Act does not even presume to articulate regulating goals, at best it is a form book. It is a mixture of flexibility, allowing couples to be married without an officiant, to accommodate some religious groups and hard-to-understand rigidity, imposing street and

(finding a valid marriage even if the license was obtained in the wrong county); *People v. Reynolds*, 217 Ill. App. 577 (Ill. App. Ct. 1920) (finding that marriages are not void for want of compliance with the statute unless the statute expressly states the invalidity of said marriages); *Gatewood v. Tunk*, 3 Bibb. 246 (Ky. Ct. App. 1813) (finding that if a marriage is solemnized by a minister, failure to provide a license from the appropriate county will not invalidate the marriage); *Stevenson v. Gray*, 17 B.Mon. 193 (Ky. Ct. App. 1856) (finding that failure to obtain a marriage license in the female’s home county did not invalidate the marriage); *State v. Trull*, 85 So. 70 (La. 1920) (finding a valid marriage where the couple obtained a license from a parish where neither lived and then used the marriage to solemnize a marriage in a different parish); *Martin v. Otis*, 124 N.E. 294 (Mass. 1919) (finding an irregular marriage because the license issued was not used in the issuing town but finding the marriage saved in that it was otherwise lawful); *In Re Silverman’s Estate*, 227 A.2d 519 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967) (finding a valid marriage when the license was not issued from the bride’s county of residence); *Abbott’s Petition*, 27 Pa. D. & C. 205 (Ct. Com. Pl. Pa. 1935) (finding a valid marriage where two minors failed to obtain a license from the appropriate county prior to the marriage and the license that was issued after the marriage was not from the county where the marriage was performed); *Douglas v. Douglas*, 6 Tenn. App. 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1927) (finding a valid marriage where the ceremony was performed in a county adjoining the issuing county and all other formalities had been fulfilled).

¹²³ Early twentieth century writing about “marriage evasion” was heavily concerned with the virtue of women, whose lives could be greatly damaged if they were led into a marriage by an older man before they were legal of age, or if they married hastily to someone not known to the community who might be a bounder. See Richmond and Hall, *supra* note *, at , for expressions of such solicitude for girls and women. . Today the concern for ill-advised marriages has more to do with immigration and financial fraud, in which a predatory person targets a person with means for an opportunistic access to resources, such as immigration permission or financial assets. The problems that sometimes arise are expressed in a website in when men recount bad experiences with Green Card marriages. <http://immigrationfraudvictims.us/case6.html>, last visited September 28, 2009. Such protection as “marriage law” provides is afforded by the marital coverage in immigration regulation, as described by Kerry Abrams. See generally Abrams, *supra* note *. State law plays no role at all in helping to detect marital opportunism.

¹²⁴ Uniform Marriage and Licenses Act (1906)

inconsistent geographic limitations on licenses.¹²⁵ It punishes various procedural missteps: such as presiding over an unlicensed marriage ceremony failing to fill out a marriage certificate and forward it to the marriage registry, getting married or issuing a license for an ineligible marriage.¹²⁶

A. How to Get Married

Couples do not consult lawyers in order to marry. Rather, they call the clerk's office to ask about the basic steps or check its website's how-to explanations.¹²⁷ Most clerk offices offer clear statements limiting the use of a license to within the state and forbidding the use of an out-of-state license.¹²⁸

1. Getting the license: States do not use the licensing statutes to regulate access to marriage in any significant sense.¹²⁹ A couple that wants to marry almost always applies for a

¹²⁵ The reason is perhaps suggested by a concern expressed by Richmond and Hall about the lack of diligence of some marriage clerks in detecting rule violations and enforcing them. In particular, laxness in enforcing New York State's rule at the time that a woman, if she lived within the state, had to obtain her license in the town or city of her residence was criticized. RICHMOND & HALL, *supra* note 2, at 70. The purpose may have been a paternalism toward women who lived in the state, and a shrug of the shoulder about women who came to New York to marry and lacked any counterpart to the possible monitoring available to New York women to prevent unwise marriages.

¹²⁶ Richmond and Hall report shortfalls in states' having a law along these lines or any system for enforcing a requirement of return by follow up, and little effort at creating good filing systems. RICHMOND & HALL, *supra* note 2, at 65.

¹²⁷ See Office of the City Clerk, Marriage FAQ, The City of New York, <http://www.cityclerk.nyc.gov/html/marriage/faq.shtml#married> (last visited Sept. 19, 2009) ("The contract must be signed by both parties and at least two witnesses and all signatures must be given within the State."); County Clerk, Marriage License Information, Clark County Nevada, http://www.accessclarkcounty.com/depts/clerk/Pages/marriage_information.aspx (last visited Sept. 19, 2009) ("In order to have a legal marriage, a ceremony must be performed in the State of Nevada within one year from date of issuance of the marriage license by any person licensed or authorized to perform ceremonies in Nevada."); Alachua County Clerk, Marriage Licenses, Alachua County Florida, <http://www.alachuacounty.us/government/clerk/famlaw/marriage.aspx> (last visited Sept. 19, 2009) ("Do both parties have to be present at the Clerk's office to apply for a license? Yes."). See also U.S.MarriageLaws.com, Question & Answer, http://www.usmarriagelaws.com/search/united_states/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2009) (providing a summary of each state's marriage laws and links to the state bureaus or clerk's

¹²⁸ "Additionally, a Notary from another state, including South Carolina and Maine, may not perform a marriage ceremony in Florida. And, a Florida notary may not marry a couple who has obtained a marriage license from another state." http://www.flgov.com/pdfs/wedding_handbook.pdf (last visited February 22, 2009).

¹²⁹ Kerry Abrams, *Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage*, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1625, 1628 (2007) ("State marriage law today primarily regulates marriage only during the entry and exit stages, and even then, the regulation is very light.")

marriage license from a county clerk in the state where the couple wishes the wedding to take place. The license requests couples to answer questions concerning basic personal data.¹³⁰ After the application is made a clerk issues the license to the couple for later use.¹³¹ Waiting periods for a license are generally nonexistent or minimal.¹³² States vary in requiring a license from the county where the marriage will be performed, where the parties reside, or from the state.¹³³ Some states insist on having both parties present when applying for a license, while others are more flexible.¹³⁴ Documentation such as proof of identity, age, Social Security number, is typically required,¹³⁵ and some states require the marriage candidates to provide a social security

¹³⁰ TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §2.004 (Vernon 2005) (describing the questions on a marriage license application). In 1929, Richmond and Hall expressed dismay that clerks tolerate perjury in license applications and make no effort to refer perjury in the applications for prosecution. Richmond and Hall, *supra* note *, at 73.

¹³¹ TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.009 (describing the issuance of the license from the clerk after the application is made.)

¹³² Richmond and Hall described the modern approach—as of 1929—as not more than five days. Richmond and Hall, *supra* note *, at 109. Abrams counts two states as of 2007 as having five-day waiting periods and 13 as having three-day waiting periods. See Abrams, *supra* note *, at 1647, n. 107. Some states have a waiting period, typically ranging from 1-3 days during which the license cannot be used. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 13-b (Mc Kinney 2007) (stating that the marriage license cannot be used within 24 hours of issuance); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 2.204 (Vernon 2008) (requiring a 72 hour waiting period before the marriage license can be used but waiving this requirement if the couple obtains pre-marital counseling). A rough count of states reveals that around half of the states now have no waiting period. As recently as 1968, the lack of a waiting period was viewed as a telling detail in writer Joan Didion’s description of Las Vegas weddings as exemplars of “geographic implausibility,” loss of connection to “real life,” and provision of “the facsimile of proper ritual” to those who want it but lack knowledge of how to do it.” JOAN DIDION, MARRYING ABSURD, IN SLOUCHING TOWARD BETHLEHEM 79 (2008 reissue) (“The State of Nevada, alone among these United States, demands neither a premarital blood test not a waiting period before or after the issuance of a marriage license.”) For a general summary of waiting period and blood test requirements, see <http://family.findlaw.com/marriage/marriage-laws/marriage-blood-test.html> (last visited October 16, 2009).

¹³³ LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §9:222 (2008) (stating that a marriage license may be obtained in any parish no matter where the parties live or where the ceremony will be performed); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.101 (West 2005) (requiring couples to obtain a license from the county of residence of either party and if non-residents from the county where the marriage will be performed).

¹³⁴ LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 225 (2008) (stating that no license shall be issued unless both parties presented themselves with a certified copy of their birth certificate); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-5 (2008) (allowing parties to apply for a marriage license in writing when accompanied by an affidavit of age from a next of kin or appear in person and take an oath to prove age); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-104 (1997) (requiring both parties to present themselves to the clerk unless one is incarcerated or ill in which case a notarized statement can be used instead). In 1929, Richmond and Hall regarded the personal presence of both parties in the clerk’s office as critical to protecting underage girls, the mentally deficient, and so forth, and lamented a death of law or procedures assuring it. RICHMOND & HALL, *supra* note 2, at 51-52.

¹³⁵ TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.002 (Vernon 2006); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.005 (Vernon 2005) (requiring proof of identity and age with birth certificate, license, passport).

number on the application for the marriage license.¹³⁶ The licensing stage is an opportunity to enforce age limitations¹³⁷ and for a few states to require medical testing, either for information or for restricting access to a license to marry.¹³⁸ Some states encourage couples to attend pre-marital counseling or offer incentives for doing so, like waiver of a waiting period after issuance of the license or reduced fees.¹³⁹ A minimal fee is usually charged for the issuance of a marriage license.¹⁴⁰ While states have generally abandoned waiting periods of any appreciable length at all,¹⁴¹ marriage licenses are valid for a limited time. .¹⁴²

2. Common Law Marriage. A common law marriage does not involve a marriage license or a ceremony. Couples begin to hold themselves out as husband and wife after they mutually agree to the marriage and begin living together as a married couple. Common law marriage is, in fact, a historical outgrowth of clandestine marriage.¹⁴³

¹³⁶ MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §551.102(1) (West 2007) (requiring the parties to place their social security numbers on the application for the marriage license); TENN. CODE ANN. §36-3-104 (1997) (requiring the contracting parties to apply for the marriage license and provide social security numbers).

¹³⁷ ALA. CODE § 30-1-4 (1975) (stating parties under 16 are not able to contract a marriage); TENN. CODE ANN. 36-3-105 (1937) (stating that it is unlawful to issue a marriage license to parties who have not reached the age of 16); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.009 (Vernon 2005) (allow minors to marry if they obtain parental consent, have previously been divorced, or a court order finding that marriage is in the child's best interest).

¹³⁸ For example, New York requires certain marriage license applicants to submit to testing for sickle cell anemia but won't invalidate a marriage where the parties fail to get the testing and can't deny the license solely because the tests come back positive. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 13-aa (Mc Kinney 1999). See also MISS. CODE ANN. §93-1-5 (2008) (requiring a medical certificate showing that the applicant does not have syphilis). Most states do not require a blood test. See *supra* note 160.

¹³⁹ TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §2.013 (Vernon 2008) (encouraging pre marital counseling and offering objectives of the course); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.204 (Vernon 2008) (waiving the 72 hour waiting period if a couple attends marriage counseling).

¹⁴⁰ ALA. CODE. § 30-1-8 (1975) (stating that persons who solemnize marriages are entitled to \$2.00); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.7 (West 2008) (stating that if a mayor performs a marriage s/he may charge a fee determined by the city council and deposited into the city's general fund); Mich. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.103(2) (West 2007) (requiring a twenty dollar fee to be paid by parties applying for a marriage license); TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 118.018 (Vernon 2008) (noting that a fee is associated with the issuance of the marriage license and is due when the license is issued).

¹⁴¹ See *supra* note 160.

¹⁴² ALA. FAM. CODE § 30-1-9 (1975) (Alabama license is only valid for 30 days from the date it is issued); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.201 (Vernon 2006) (license is only valid for 31 days after issuance).

¹⁴³ See GORAN LIND, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE: A LEGAL INSTITUTION FOR COHABITATION 179 (2008) ("Common law marriage has its origins in old English ecclesiastical law . . . Guiding Supreme Court, without reference to earlier American case law . . . stated: 'No formal solemnization of marriage was requisite. A contract of marriage made per verba de praesenti amounts to an actual marriage, and is as valid as if made in facie ecclesiae.'")

Only a few states still recognize common law marriage but the Full Faith and Credit Clause usually allows a common law marriage to be recognized by all states if legal in the jurisdiction in which it arose.¹⁴⁴ In the handful of states that retain common law marriage, the doctrine is sometimes used to recognize a marriage in which the ceremony failed for lack of compliance with the statutes.¹⁴⁵ In addition, states that do not recognize common law marriage sometimes stretch doctrine to recognize common law marriages of couples who reside there.¹⁴⁶

3. Proxy Marriage. In limited jurisdictions and circumstances in a few states,¹⁴⁷ marriage licenses and marriage ceremonies can be executed with proxies substituting for one or both members of the marriage.¹⁴⁸ The availability of these statutes does not appear to be widely known, although some efforts seem to be emerging to offer proxy services through commercial solicitation of couples who do not have any previous connection with the state of Montana.¹⁴⁹

The decision, supported by the leading scholarship, had remarkable impact on the case law during the entire 1800's.”).

¹⁴⁴ TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401 (Vernon 2006) (describing the requirements of an informal marriage); http://www.expertlaw.com/library/family_law/common_law.html (describing the process of common law marriage and listing the states that recognize them).

¹⁴⁵ *Id.*

¹⁴⁶ *Renshaw v. Heckler*, 787 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding a valid common law marriage for a New York couple that had traveled through Pennsylvania approximately eight times in twenty-one years and had cohabited under the reputation of being a married couple); *Blaw-Knox Constr. Equip. Co.*, 596 A.2d 679 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (finding a valid 38 year common law marriage for a Maryland couple that spent two nights at a hotel in Pennsylvania where they had the reputation of being married and cohabited); *Carpenter v. Carpenter*, 617 N.Y.S.2d 903 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (finding a valid common law marriage for a New York couple who spent eleven days in Pennsylvania during their 25 year relationship during which they held themselves out as husband and wife); *In Re Claim of Coney v. R.S.R. Corp.*, 563 N.Y.S.2d 211 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (finding a valid common law marriage where the couple had traveled through Georgia, a state recognizing common law marriages, for three days); *Katebi v. Hooshiari*, 732 N.Y.S.2d 382 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (finding a valid common law marriage for a New York couple who had traveled through Pennsylvania and Georgia holding themselves out as husband and wife at various times during their relationship); *State v. Phelps*, 652 N.E.2d 1032 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (finding a valid common law marriage).

¹⁴⁷ *See* Section II. D.

¹⁴⁸ TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.006 (Vernon 2005) (allowing for single a single proxy to apply for the marriage license with an affidavit from the party to be married and allowing for double proxy where the couple are both on active duty or both in correctional facilities); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.007 (Vernon 2005) (describing the affidavit to be submitted for the proxy representation); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.203 (Vernon 2006) (stating that a proxy can appear at the ceremony for the absent party).

¹⁴⁹ *See* S&B, Inc., *Marriage by Proxy*, [MarriagebyProxy.com](http://www.marriagebyproxy.com/), <http://www.marriagebyproxy.com/> (last visited Sept. 19, 2009) (“Proxy marriages are our specialty.”) (offering a double proxy in Montana for military service members, and a single proxy in Colorado, which does not require military service nor residency).

Because of the general understanding that marriage is associated with the presence of a couple in the state that authorizes the marriage, the clerk in Montana has expressed unease about the extent to which the statute is being used by couples with no connection to Montana.¹⁵⁰

4. Regulations Affecting the Ceremony. There is no specific blueprint for the proper marriage ceremony but many states require that the parties declare their desire to be husband and wife in the presence of an officiant and sometimes witnesses, who must be present.¹⁵¹ Most couples assume they must be present in the state that marries them; gay couples in the recent weddings in Iowa rode in busses to marry in Iowa,¹⁵² and no one commented that it was odd to require their brief physical presence.

State statutes specify the parties who are qualified to solemnize a marriage, with some states imposing fairly rigid, geographically based limitations¹⁵³ backed by criminal sanctions¹⁵⁴ and others providing flexible one-day certifications.¹⁵⁵ In other states, the officiants

¹⁵⁰ Maurice Possley, *Marriage by Proxy Booming in Montana*, The Bismarck Tribune (May 16, 2007) available at http://www.bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/article_6530df9f-40b7-5203-b60b-feb517c4cef5.html (“The purpose of the bill was for the military, and there was a fear that it was being abused. The intention was to modify the law without shutting the door to its highest intentions.”). Inquiries have come from all the world. ‘There were hundreds and hundreds of requests for information. We decided the law needed to be amended to make it clear and eliminate ambiguity, although I am not sure how Montana has the authority to issue marriage licenses for an entirely foreign jurisdiction.’); Dan Barry, *Trading Vows in Montana, No Couple Required*, NY TIMES (Mar. 10, 2008) available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/10/us/10land.html?_r=1 (“‘We were getting calls from Turkey and the Middle East,’ recalls Peg Allison, the tolerant district court clerk here in Flathead County. ‘From people who were definitely not citizens of the United States, and had nothing to do with the military.’”).

¹⁵¹ Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.9 (West 2005) (requiring that the parties declare in the presence of the officiant and two witnesses that they take one another as husband or wife); Tenn. Code Ann. §36-3-302 (2009) (requiring that the parties take one another as husband and/or wife in the presence of the minister/officer). N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §12 (Mc Kinney 1999) (requiring at least one witness be present at the marriage ceremony).

¹⁵² See *infra* Section III.A.

¹⁵³ MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.7 (West 2008) (stating that a district court judge or magistrate may perform marriages in the districts s/he serves, a municipal judge in the city/township, a probate judge in the court district, a federal judge can seemingly perform anywhere in the state, a mayor may perform anywhere in the county where the city s/he is mayor of is located, a county clerk in the county where s/he works, religious ministers anywhere in the state, etc.); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §11 (Mc Kinney 2008) (stating that only federal judges of the districts in New York may solemnize marriages and various other federal judges of the state); Va. Code Ann. § 20-25 (2004) (stating federal judges who are residents of the state may solemnize weddings within the state).

¹⁵⁴ Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. Section 551.15 (“If any person should undertake to join others in marriage, knowing that he is not lawfully authorized so to do, or knowing of any legal impediment to the proposed marriage, he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail

who are awarded authority by the statutes are typically described as members of the clergy, judiciary, or other public officials such as a mayor.¹⁵⁶ States generally recognize that the rules should respect religious traditions that do not adhere to the format of having an officiant who presides and declares the couple to be married.¹⁵⁷ For example, New York allows couples to enter a written contract and effectively marry themselves in the presence of a judge or other official of the state.¹⁵⁸ Statutes often specify that a good faith belief that an officiating person had authority is sufficient to create a valid marriage even though the belief was mistaken.¹⁵⁹ The rules for who may officiate can be generally overcome if a desired officiant becomes a member of the Universal Life Church,¹⁶⁰ which allows virtually anyone to become a minister.¹⁶¹

not more than 1 year, or by a fine not less than 50 nor more than 500 dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.”)

¹⁵⁵ Massachusetts allows any friend or family member to marry a couple so long as the application is sent in six weeks in advance. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 39 (1991). Vermont will temporarily certify someone to officiate over a wedding within the state provided that person meets the statutory requirements. Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 18, § 5144a (2008).

¹⁵⁶ ALA. FAM. CODE. §30-1-7 (1975) (naming licensed ministers, judges, pastors of religious societies). Massachusetts is already providing, on the Governor’s website, a prominent offer for flexibility as to officiants: One Day Marriage Designation Instructions, which permits any friend or family member to apply for a one-day designation to preside at a wedding in Massachusetts, may be downloaded from the Governor’s website <http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=gov3homepage&L=1&L0=Home&sid=Agov3>, last visited on September 28, 2009

¹⁵⁷ N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §12 (1999) (stating that the marriage solemnization requirements of the state do not apply to the Quaker religions); Tenn. Code Ann § 36-3-301 (2005) (stating that a marriage where there are witnesses but no presiding officiant is valid); 2009 Vt. Acts & Resolves page no. 3 (stating that the solemnization requirements of the state do not mandate an officiant for Quaker ceremonies). *See also* Ann Estin, *supra* note 13, at 94 (discussing religious exemptions in marriage statutes).

¹⁵⁸ N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 11 (Mc Kinney 2009); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 12 (1999) (simply requiring the couple to take one another as husband or wife in the presence of a magistrate or clergyman).

¹⁵⁹ TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.302 (Vernon 2005) (stating that the marriage will still be valid even when officiant lacks authority so long as there was no indication that the officiant lacked authority or the parties believed in good faith that the marriage was valid); MMDA § 206.d (a marriage is still valid even if the party solemnizing the marriage was not qualified if the parties believe s/he was qualified).

¹⁶⁰ Universal Life Church v. Utah, Memorandum Decision and Order V. Case No. 2:01CV278K (2002) (holding unconstitutional a 2001 Utah statute providing that ordination by the internet is not valid for purposes eligibility to preside as a minister in a Utah marriage ceremony).

¹⁶¹ Welcome Universal Life Ministry, <http://www.themonastery.org/jcontent/training/2-wedding-training?template=themonastery>, last visited October 17, 2009 (providing procedures to become an online ordained minister). *See also* Universal Life Church v. Utah, *supra* note 160 (“The ULC will ordain anyone free, for life, without questions of faith. Anyone can be ordained a ULC minister in a matter of minutes by clicking onto the ULC’s website and by providing a name, address, and e-mail address. Anyone can also be ordained by mailing to the ULC a name and address. There is no oath, ceremony, or particular form required. “).

5. Clerical and Record-Keeping Rules. The officiant is typically responsible for returning the license and certificate to the appropriate county clerk.¹⁶² Local officials often have record-keeping obligations.¹⁶³ In many respects, though, the follow through from the strict ground rules for obtaining and using a license within geographic bounds does not produce a readily accessible set of official records and statistics about marriage.

6. Lenient Ex Post Enforcement: Forgiveness of Procedural Flaws. Courts, with relatively rare exceptions,¹⁶⁴ do not see the rules as sufficiently controlling as to invalidate marriages. When the rules are violated, courts employ various savings doctrines, with more or less legal precision,¹⁶⁵ to hold procedurally deficient marriages valid. Examples of flaws courts

¹⁶² MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §551.104 (West 2007) (requiring the officiant to fill in the blank marriage license/certificate and return it to the issuing clerk within 10 days of the ceremony); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-303 (1989) (stating that the person who solemnizes the marriage must return it within 3 days to the issuing clerk); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §2.206 (Vernon 2006) (stating that the person conducting the ceremony is responsible for recording the license and returning it to the county that issued it within 30 days of the ceremony); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.208 (Vernon 2006) (describing the information that the county clerk must record upon receipt of the marriage license); MMDA § 206.a- (requiring that a party to the marriage complete the marriage license and send it to the issuing clerk).

¹⁶³ ALA. FAM. CODE § 30-1-12 (1975) (stating that the probate judge must keep a book with a record of all the licenses issued by him/her); ALA. FAM. CODE § 30-1-13 (1975) (stating that if a person other than the probate judge performs the marriage, s/he must send information regarding the marriage to the probate for proper registration); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §551.104 (West 2007) (persons officiating over a marriage ceremony should keep a record of the marriages performed); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-103 (1996) (stating that the county clerk who issues licenses is authorized to record the license when returned to the clerk).

¹⁶⁴ *Edwards v. Franke*, 364 P.2d 60 (Alaska 1961) (refusing to find a valid marriage where the parties failed to obtain a marriage license and finding that the Alaska statute banning common law marriage was mandatory and not directory); *Welch v. State*, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 430 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (finding no valid marriage where couple did not get a marriage license or a solemnize the marriage aside from privately taking vows); *Williams v. Williams*, 460 N.E.2d 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (finding no valid marriage where couple did not get a marriage license); *Nelson v. Marshall*, 869 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (failing to find a valid marriage where the parties failed to obtain a marriage license); *Farah v. Farah*, 429 S.E.2d 626 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (finding a marriage void where the parties entered a proxy marriage in England that failed to meet the statutory requirements although there was a religious ceremony).

¹⁶⁵ *Farley v. Farley*, 94 Ala. 501 (Alaska 1892) (finding a valid but voidable marriage where no marriage license was obtained and solemnizer was not authorized); *Darling v. Dent*, 100 S.W. 747 (Ark. 1907) (finding that a marriage could be valid despite failure to obtain or record a marriage license); *Carabetta v. Carabetta*, 438 A.2d 109 (Conn. 1980) (finding a valid marriage where the parties failed to obtain a marriage license but had the marriage solemnized in a religious ceremony and the statutory requirements were deemed to be advisory); *Gay v. Pantell*, 139 S.E. 543 (Ga. 1927) (finding that a marriage performed without a license was voidable not void); *Feehley v. Feehley*, 99 A. 663 (Md. 1916) (finding a valid marriage where the parties failed to obtain a marriage license but participated in a religious ceremony); *Haggin v. Haggin*, 53 N.W. 209 (Neb. 1892) (finding that failure to obtain a marriage license did not affect the validity of a marriage); *Berenson v. Berenson*, 98 N.Y.S.2d 912 (N.Y. Dom Rel. Ct. 1950) (finding that failure to obtain marriage license does not invalidate the marriage); *Heller v. Heller*, 68

“fix” include failure to file the license as required,¹⁶⁶ an insufficient number of witnesses,¹⁶⁷ ineligibility of the presiding official,¹⁶⁸ and marriage in the wrong county.¹⁶⁹ The rules drive the process but are often understood ex post to be a brittle bit of law that should not be a barrier to recognizing a marriage. Couples face the greatest risk if they intentionally ignore a rule, especially the rule requiring that a license be used within the state that issued it.¹⁷⁰ One state attorney general has issued an opinion offering a purportedly complete proof that a couple that uses the state’s license in another state would not have a valid marriage.¹⁷¹

On the other hand, two state cases demonstrate a willingness on the part of courts to construe the marriage code liberally, as containing authorization to couples to marry outside the

N.Y.S.2d 545 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1947) (finding that failure to procure a marriage license did not invalidate a marriage); *In re Cossin’s Estate*, 126 N.Y.S.2d 363 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1953) (finding that failure to obtain a marriage license did not affect the validity of a marriage solemnized by a religious ceremony); *In re Kaminsky’s Will*, 126 N.Y.S.2d 220 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1953) (finding a valid marriage where the parties were married in a religious ceremony despite failure to obtain a marriage license); *In re Levy’s Estate*, 6 N.Y.S.2d 544 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1938) (finding that failure to procure a license did not invalidate a marriage); *State v. Parker*, 11 S.E. 517 (N.C. 1890) (finding that failure to procure a marriage license does not invalidate a marriage); *State v. Robbins*, 28 N.C. 23 (N.C. 1845) (finding that failure to obtain a marriage license did not invalidate a marriage); *Chapman v. Chapman*, 32 S.W. 564 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895) (finding a valid marriage despite failure to obtain a marriage license); *Morville v. State*, 141 S.W. 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 1911) (finding that a marriage license is evidence of marriage but not a prerequisite of marriage); *Mc Donald v. White*, 89 P. 891 (Wash. 1907) (finding a valid marriage where it was unclear whether parties obtained a marriage license).

¹⁶⁶ *Krizman v. Industrial Accident Commission*, 14 Cal.App.2d 419, 58 P.2d 405 (1936) (marriage in foreign state not invalidated by failure to record marriage certificate).

¹⁶⁷ *Parker v. Saileau*, 213 So. 2d 190 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1968)

¹⁶⁸ *Shamsee v. Shamsee*, 51 A.D.2d 1028, 381 N.Y.S.2d 127 (2d Dep’t 1976).

¹⁶⁹ See *supra* note 147.

¹⁷⁰ See *infra* Section III.A.

¹⁷¹ *Marriages Pursuant to a License Issued in Alabama Must be Solemnized in Alabama to be Valid*, 1999 AL. Op. Att’y Gen. 00144 (1999), <http://www.ago.state.al.us/> (follow “official opinions” hyperlink on the left; then follow “>>Go Directly to Opinion Search” hyperlink in the center of the page, near the top; then enter “marriage license” in the full text search and push the “Search” button; scroll down to the opinion numbered 1999-144) (finding that marriages performed pursuant to an Alabama marriage license must be performed in Alabama to be valid); *Validity of Marriage Under Certain Conditions*, 1996 WL 37594 (Ark. A.G. 1996) (finding a valid marriage where the couple used an Arkansas marriage license for a marriage performed in Italy); *contra Justice Court Judges Authority to Perform Marriage Ceremonies*, 2001 WL 1725322 (Miss. A.G. 2001) (finding that a justice could not perform a marriage ceremony pursuant to a non-state issued marriage license); *Validity of a Marriage Performed Outside of Tennessee Pursuant to a License Issued by a Tennessee County Clerk*, 1985 WL 193738 (Tenn. A.G. 1985) (finding that a Tennessee marriage license does not have to be used within the state of Tennessee).

jurisdiction but pursuant to its ceremonial marriage laws.¹⁷² In the instance of the Arizona case, even though the ex post liberality made use of a claim about the ex ante rules, the conceptual divide persisted in the common understandings of Arizona officials, who continued to inform the public, on websites and by telephone, that an Arizona marriage license is only valid for use within Arizona.¹⁷³ Finally, statutes occasionally extend forgiveness for past, or even prospective, use of the state's marriage license outside the state.¹⁷⁴

IV. Legislative Considerations

A. General Overview of Goals of a Regime of E-Marriage

How might a regime of e-marriage within the United States look, taking into account both the values to be preserved in current marriage procedures and the possibility for improvements and modernization. The following lists some regulatory goals such a regime might further:

1. Make marriage readily accessible for those unable to be present together at a ceremony in the state solemnizing the marriage;

¹⁷² *Barbosa-Johnson v. Johnson*, 174 Ariz. 567 (Ariz. App. Div. 2, 1993) (holding that the provisions of the marriage evasion statute permit an Arizona marriage license to be used anywhere in the world); *In re Petition for Compulsory Accounting in Estate of Farraj Slip Copy*, 2009 WL 997481 (Table) N.Y. Sur., 2009. April 14, 2009 (holding that a religious ceremony in New Jersey entered into without a license was a marriage solemnized under New York marriage law).

¹⁷³ Information on the internet, provided by Clerk of the Superior Court of Maricopa County, states, "The marriage license is valid for one year, and can only be used within the State of Arizona." <http://phoenix.about.com/cs/weddings/ht/marriagelicense.htm> (last visited October 17, 2009).

¹⁷⁴ VA. CODE ANN. § 20-37-1 Validation of certain marriages solemnized outside of the commonwealth (If Virginia license is used in a marriage outside of the commonwealth with a Virginia license, the marriage has the status as if it was performed in Virginia); TENN. CODE ANN. 36-3-103 (c) (1) ("If a license issued by a county clerk in Tennessee is used to solemnize a marriage outside Tennessee, such marriage and parties, their property and their children shall have the same status as if the marriage were solemnized in this state."); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-37.1. Validation of certain marriages solemnized outside of Commonwealth (validating all marriages "occurring prior to May 2, 1989" using Tennessee licenses outside the Commonwealth).

2. Assure that each member of the couple is entering the marriage freely and without pressure or coercion or deception;
3. Assure that each member of the couple is in fact free to marry based on current marital status and age and, for states that deny marriage to same sex couples, gender;
4. Render the ceremony readily available to friends and family without regard to their ability to be present with either member of the couple;
5. Provide opportunities for innovation by private businesses delivering remote marriage ceremonies;
6. Take advantage of efficiencies to reduce cost to the average couple wishing to use the e-marriage procedure;
7. Allow new room for the state to earn fees from funds available as a result of less costly marital mechanics;¹⁷⁵
8. Give heightened protections against imprudent marriages based on only casual acquaintance;
9. Improve national electronic system that allows for accurate records of existing marriages and for the compilation of useful data for the study of marital patterns and trends; and
10. Make necessary recitals asserting that the compliance with the state's e-marriage procedure constitutes constructive presence in the state.¹⁷⁶

In addition to the elements any statute could have, states could consider protections extending beyond current law, to protect parties against a coerced or fraudulent marriage, a significant problem in immigration. This is an area in which states could experiment to

¹⁷⁵ See *infra* note 176 and accompanying text.

¹⁷⁶ The Virginia marriage code, as well as the Tennessee code, contains such a locution in its statutory forgiveness for marriage licenses mistakenly used outside Virginia. See *supra* note 199.

outsource some components of the marriage procedure, allowing certified internet counselors to create protocols for validation of marital bona fides that exceed the absent protocols in the current nominally regulatory but de facto “de-regulated” licensing regime.¹⁷⁷ Internet marriage procedure could recover aspects of the original concerns animating the publication of banns.¹⁷⁸ While a general marriage statute might face constitutional barriers if it created onerous counseling requirements that could result in a complete denial to a couple of a license, the extension of internet convenience could be conditioned on agreement by the parties to undergo more extensive confirmation of their identity, their personal knowledge of one another, the existence or not of any side agreements or inducements, and the lack of any coercion.

Like Louisiana’s and Arizona’s covenant marriage, such “gold-plated” marriage requirements could signal a higher degree of commitment. Some newlyweds might find this ability to show their spouse greater commitment valuable to overcome uncertainty on the spouse’s or his or her family’s part. As these requirements impose cost in terms of time and money, they could be viewed as “credible signals” that reliably track actors’ sincerity.

The variety of regulatory goals marriage laws could further suggest the possibility of jurisdictional competition. Most concretely, states could compete on marriage fees. To the degree states have a “monopoly” power over marriage they can extract economic rents, *i.e.*, prices that exceed marginal cost. Governments can extract these rents directly in the form of fees or in procedural requirements and like inconveniences.

¹⁷⁷ Kerry Abrams, *Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage*, 91 MINN. LAW REV. 1624, 1626-28 (2007).

¹⁷⁸ See RICHMOND & HALL, *supra* note 2, at 32 (explaining how banns have become abandoned because “the old system leaned heavily upon publicity, but this was under a settled, small-town organization of society in which publicity was genuinely effective” but advocating advance notice periods to allow diligence by clerks and second thoughts by applicants, with concern to avoid consummation of inappropriate unions).

In competitive markets, providers of any good, whether status or commodity, will lower their price toward marginal cost. Jurisdictions, to the degree they compete for marriage solemnizing, would presumably lower their fees to the cost of accept filing and recordkeeping. States would impose inconveniences and procedural requirements only to the degree necessary for the administrative structure to achieve its goals. In addition, states would offer a greater variety of products, with perhaps a differential pricing structure.

Presumably, given their current geographic monopoly, states currently extract supra-competitive rents in the form of high registration fees and burdensome procedural requirements. A competitive market would lower fees and lead to more convenient forms of marriage solemnization. Assuming that state authorization of a marriage has a lower marginal cost, competition could cut costs significantly. This price-cutting might be likely to occur because e-marriage offers the opportunity for states to capture an international market in marriage.¹⁷⁹ One could envision that states could offer marriage authorization at very low price but earn significant revenue by attracting an enormous global market. At the same time, the “price” for “rare” types of marriage, like the same sex marriage, could be quite high – perhaps capped by the cost of travelling to a distant location to get married.

B. Examples of Legislative Language

We provide here a tentative few drafts of approaches a legislature could take to kicking off experimentation with e-marriage. We do not set forth a comprehensive menu of the variations that might be possible, would depend on how many couples in what circumstances a state wishes to aid with a more accessible marriage procedure. We do not draft here model

¹⁷⁹ See *supra* note 150 (discussing popularity of Montana double proxy statute, particularly among individuals from the Middle East).

statutes to address matters such as the standardization of e-marriage statutes for purposes of data collection, or federal revisions to immigration law that cede to sound state law the supervision of marriages by U.S. citizens to non-citizens. All of these subjects are ripe for innovation that strengthens state administration of marriage law and procedures. We also do not draft a complete “e-marriage” statute in which the parties may be bound in accordance with rules for e-contracts. Such a statute requires more elaboration of the underlying protections, forms of screening, and involvement by officials than is indicated for this preliminary treatment. Such a statute is of the sort that could best be developed, in our view, through proposals for internet protocols developed by web experts in consultation with state legislators and administrators.

The following drafts select the current marriage code of Massachusetts as a starting point for possible e-marriage provisions. Some are quite modest and avoid extending simple internet marriage to couples; others specify limitations relating to the citizenship of members of the couple or their connection to Massachusetts. The last suggested draft provides for a state study to design a complete protocol for e-marriage.

OPTION 1: Teleconferencing, Limitation to Recent Domiciliaries

Massachusetts Section 59 E-Marriage of Commonwealth Domiciliaries

A marriage may be solemnized for persons physically located in any place outside the Commonwealth by any of those persons designated in Section 38, provided that such marriage shall be conducted by live teleconferencing in which all parties can see and hear all other parties, the officiant authorized by the Commonwealth is located physically within the Commonwealth, and the parties to the marriage have been legal domiciliaries of the Commonwealth within past two years. The participation in the ceremony by teleconferencing shall be deemed to be legal presence within the Commonwealth for purposes of establishing the Commonwealth’s jurisdiction over the parties. The officiant shall fully comply with all provisions of the Chapter 207. Marriage specifying the obligation of the officiant.

Massachusetts Section 28 Certificate of intention of marriage; delivery; time

ADD AT END Delivery of the certificate, signed by him in accordance with this section, by the clerk or registrar may be accomplished by electronic delivery in a form consonant with best practices for electronic delivery of official signatures on official documents.

OPTION 2: Teleconferencing, Limitation to U.S. Citizens

Section 59 E-Marriage by United States citizens

A marriage may be solemnized for United States citizens physically located in any place outside the Commonwealth by any of those persons designated in Section 38, provided that such marriage shall be conducted by live teleconferencing in which all parties can see and hear all other parties and the officiant authorized by the Commonwealth is located physically within the Commonwealth. The participation in the ceremony by teleconferencing shall be deemed to be legal presence within the Commonwealth for purposes of establishing the Commonwealth's jurisdiction over the parties. The officiant shall fully comply with all provisions of the Chapter 207. Marriage specifying the obligations of the officiant.

OPTIONAL ADDITION: Authorization of Study of E-Marriage Formats

Section 60 E-Marriage Study by Governor of Commonwealth; Issues; Public/Private Collaboration; Schedule

The Commonwealth desires to develop a procedure for marriage to be solemnized by means of remote communication for persons physically located in any place outside the Commonwealth by any of those persons designated in Section 38, either designed and administered by the state secretary or other appropriate department of the Commonwealth, or designed and provided by e-marriage providers certified by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as E-Marriage Screening and Marriage Solemnization Massachusetts Web Services. The Governor shall conduct a study, with requests for proposals for e-marriage protocols, to determine the alternatives for implementing a system of e-marriage that makes marriage widely accessible to couples wishing to make use of the Massachusetts marriage law, provides counseling to marriage applicants consonant with risks identified as associated with remote marriage or desired by applicants who choose e-marriage for the purpose of heightened screening of the bona fides of the parties filing a notice of intention of marriage, provides state-of-the-art security against identity fraud and misstatements concerning material background facts, takes appropriate account of federal interests in regulating immigration, and establishes a schedule of fees advisable for extending such e-marriage service. By two years following this act, the Governor shall report to the General Assembly on his recommendations for a system of e-marriage in the Commonwealth, including specific recommendations for public/private collaboration in delivering e-marriage services sound in design and reliable in administration. The Governor is authorized to consult with business entities expert in wedding practices and internet business models, other states contemplating e-marriage services, and immigration officials and experts. As used in this section, "remote communication" means any means by which one party may indicate an intention to be bound without being physically present with the

officiant or the other party; it may, but need not, be a form of remote communication in which the parties and the officiant are simultaneously able to make their presence known.

VI. Conclusion

E-marriage will facilitate the goods that marriage provides: access to it as a citizenship rite laden with symbolism, duration in relationships entered into with awareness of the weight of the commitment, care in confirming the identity and even probing the background and motives of both parties, and public celebration of the significance of a marriage in the spaces where social meanings are shared.

Our proposal allows couples to define their own community, freed from the contingency of geography and the historical accident of state borders. Although we rely upon the power of internet communications, we do not suggest that marriages need be no more than a click of a mouse (although they could be if states and couples so desire). Rather, states could write statutes suited to their sense of need and preference that emerges from popular preference. We recognize that people like the physicality of the ceremony: the flowers, the smells, the cake, the suits and dresses, the priest or other state officiant, the crying relatives, the kiss. States and individuals could choose the level of ritual and regulation they wish to a much greater degree than ever before. .

Not only could Massachusetts allow out-of-state officiants to perform a ceremony with all the bells and whistles of local color and sounds and smells, with outsourcing, a state could create private licensors sworn to provide counseling to applicants, with special inquiries directed to applicants where there are warning signs associated with marital fraud.

Just as Delaware now works to keep its state corporate law a good policy balance between the interests of corporate managers, shareholders, and other constituencies, states can

begin constructive work to modernize marriage statutes in light of the types of marriage risks that lonely singles face today and thereby reduce the reliance on federal family law. As Kerry Abrams has described, immigration law attempts to address such risks.¹⁸⁰ But its application is limited to marriages by citizens to non-citizens,¹⁸¹ doing nothing to extend protection to marriages between U.S. citizens. Further, it lacks the capacity of the states for experimentation based on competition to provide sound, accessible marriage licensure in combination with enhanced protection.

.We are aware of the fact that, for some gay couples, the power of having the marriage is the power of hearing their own state say their marriage is legitimate. For such couples, the ideal picture of their marriage involves the convergence of the status, the recognition, and the location. While our proposal would increase the number of out-of-state marriages, it would do nothing on its own to make the couple's home state recognize the marriage.

For some, this limitation would be a bone of contention. We agree with the animating sentiment: marriage is not just some contract. It responds to deep, little understood human needs for community and societal recognition. But which community can work this magic? Why must it be the domiciliary state, an increasingly artificial and meaningless jurisdiction, particularly as most human interactions move on-line into the world of cyberspace?

Our proposal allows what the economists would say is the second best solution. To the degree marriage's utility is a function of the size and depth of the community recognizing it for couples excluded from that recognition, e-marriage is not optimal but it could offer significant satisfaction and happiness nonetheless. In light of the culture wars, e-marriage may be the best possible resolution of cultural difference. Couples in marriage hostile states could have it

¹⁸⁰ Abrams, *supra* note 177, at 1635.

¹⁸¹ Abrams, *supra* note 177, at 1635-40.

without persuading the most socially conservative adherents of Biblical claims about marriage. Further, because of the ubiquity of social networking sites, e-marriage can actually enhance the breadth of the community engaged with a marriage as a social asset for friends, family, and the wider society.¹⁸²

Modernizing marriage law to make the ceremonial moment of marriage portable across state lines, subject to safeguards, is an important means of assuring that the legal moment of marriage remains a moment of public commitment attached to the power of the state to make the marriage being celebrated lawful.¹⁸³ The state does indeed provide secular magic in the public legal moment of marriage, but it does so not through the festooning of marriage statutes with limitation and procedural stipulations, but through the strength of the assurance that the state will enforce the status agreed to in public by preventing claims that no marriage occurred and will adjudicate problems that arise in the marriage in accordance with civil law.¹⁸⁴ Combining symbol and law maintains marriage as a social good. Remote marriage statutes can be gradually developed in ways that enhance that combination and bring the goods of marriage to more couples, with greater reliability and fewer openings for confusion.

Our review of marriage history shows that marriage authorization has been remarkably flexible and not geographically based. It is therefore within the power of a state to authorize e-marriage, a legal proposition not immediately apparent. More broadly, to the degree a ritual must have historical bases to be powerful, we show that e-marriage has such bases. To the claim that history cannot prove what we should do after 200 years in our country of a heavily predominant

¹⁸² Indeed, the arguable impact of the on-line social connection is appearing in the way people make a divorce part of public ritual. Amanda Fortini, *The Facebook Divorce*, Salon, http://www.salon.com/mwt/feature/2009/09/29/facebook_divorce/index.html?source=newsletter, September 29, 2009, (last visited September 29, 2009).

geographic literalism, we reply: e-marriage answers contemporary needs for convenience, for a defusion of the cultural conflict over marriage, potentially for enhanced protection of a kind to which marriage law has aspired but rarely achieved, and it has a powerful basis in age-old tradition. E-marriage is a good innovation that can recover lost goals of marriage law, enrich traditions, and remove needless barriers to marriage for many couples. E-marriage is consonant with our values and with our history.

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This draft is a working draft and will be revised occasionally. Comments may be made to Mae Kuykendall at mae.kuykendall@law.msu.edu or by calling 734-645-5769; or to Adam Candeub at Candeub@law.msu.edu or by calling 517-432-6894.